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This dissertation is a collection of papers analyzing the effect of transport and credit 
infrastructure on the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Chapter 1 uses a partial 
equilibrium framework to isolate the effect of rural transport infrastructure improvement. 
It obtains an unbiased estimate of transport improvement on high yield variety technology 
adoption, a mechanism by which infrastructure improvement can affect agricultural return. 
It finds that although transportation infrastructure improvement significantly increases 
acreage for high yield variety rice, the acreage for local variety rice does not decrease but 
remains constant post improvement. The findings suggests there transport improvement 
needs to be complemented with other measures to yield complete adoption of improved 
agricultural technology. 
Chapter 2 improves upon Chapter 1 and uses a rural market equilibrium framework 
to analyze the effect of rural transport infrastructure on agricultural productivity under 
perfect and imperfect markets. This chapter, using a theoretical model derives scenarios, 
(involving relative credit elasticity in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and 
elasticity of total stock of labor and capital in the rural market), under which agricultural 
productivity will be enhanced or deteriorated  in the short run and long run under perfect 
and imperfect market scenarios. It empirically examines the effect of transport 
improvement on conditions that determine its effect on agricultural return and finds that 
transport improvement may increase, decrease or keep agricultural output constant 
depending on its effect on stock of capital and labor in rural markets.   
Chapter 3 analyzes the role of access to finance in promoting the efficiency and growth of 
micro-enterprise activities and role of access to finance in participation of micro-
enterprises. It finds that access to finance is a significant constraining factor in the growth 
of micro-enterprises and that the returns to capital invested in micro-enterprises are 
significantly higher than the interest rates charged by some of the micro-finance institutions 
that borrow from the government at low rates. The findings of this chapter indicates that 
there are big gains to be realized from expansion of access to credit to micro-enterprises at 
reasonable interest rates through the existing network of micro-finance institutions. 
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Chapter 1: Impact of rural road improvement on High Yield 
Variety Technology Adoption: Evidence from Bangladesh  
Rubaba Ali   
 
1.1 Introduction 
Improved roads reduce transportation cost and time taken to go to markets. Low 
transportation costs equalize prices across markets that are close to each other and are 
connected by good quality roads. Road improvement reduces transportation cost of rice, 
fertilizers, pesticides and seeds. Ali (2010) provides evidence that rural road improvement 
reduced per maund (40 kilograms) transportation cost of fertilizer, seed and rice for 
households that received road improvement in Bangladesh. Reduced transportation cost 
decreases net input price (price paid plus transportation cost) of seeds, fertilizers, and 
pesticides and increases the net output price of rice (selling price of rice minus transport 
cost) that farmers receive.  
Better roads improve farmers’ access to extension workers. Extension workers inform 
farmers about new technology (Reynar, Musser and Bruening 1996) and train them on 
efficient use of fertilizer, irrigation, etc. (DAE 1999). Improved access to information on 
HYV should induce farmers to allocate more land to HYV rice. In Bangladesh, to attain 
high-yield potential, farmers purchase improved new HYV seeds when they allocate land 
to HYV rice. They commonly prepare seeds at home to cultivate traditional local variety 
rice (Van Mele, Ahmad, and Magor 2005). Therefore, lower transportation cost reduces 
the relative price of HYV to local variety seed. This should increase purchase of high 
yielding variety seeds and acreage for HYV rice. Lower prices of fertilizer and pesticide 
should induce farmers to use fertilizer and pesticide necessary to attain the high-yield 
potential of high-yielding variety seeds. Acreage of high yield variety rice by project 
households should increase post road improvement because post road improvement HYV 
rice production is relatively more profitable. It is possible that farmers substitute HYV 
acreage for local variety rice acreage. 
Storing rice over long period lowers the price that farmers can receive. Therefore, 
growers sell the bulk of their crop volume within a short span of time although rice is not 
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perishable. Individual farmers are likely to suffer a low bargaining power in the village 
market if they have lower access to neighboring markets. Therefore, households have the 
incentive to grow more rice, which they can attain by increasing local variety rice acreage, 
substituting partially HYV for local variety rice acreage or growing HYV rice exclusively. 
This chapter analyzes the impact of rural road improvement on local variety, HYV and 
aggregate rice acreage.   
The economics literature related to road rehabilitation and agriculture in developing 
countries has focused primarily on the horizontal expansion of farm output (Binswanger et 
al., 1993; Gannon and Liu, 1997). The importance of good infrastructure is widely 
recognized in the technology adoption and diffusion literature (Sunding and Zilberman, 
2001). Despite the vast literature, Zavale (2005), Manalili and Gonzales (2005) and Ahmed 
and Hossain (1990) are the most relevant papers that examine the association between 
infrastructure and high yielding input adoption. These studies use cross-sectional data from 
Mozambique (Zavale (2005)), the Philippines (Manalili and Gonzales (2005)) and 
Bangladesh (Ahmed and Hossain (1990)) to analyze the effect of transport infrastructure 
along with other types of infrastructure so are unable to isolate the effect of road 
improvement. In addition, these papers suffer from either omitted variables bias as they do 
not control for key variables and/or selection bias as they use cross-sectional data which 
cannot account for unobserved fixed area characteristics that affect both road placement 
and technology adoption (Binswanger et al. (1993)).  
Using panel data, this chapter analyzes the Bangladeshi farmers' acreage response 
to rural road improvement program called Rural Development Project (RDP)1 under which 
the placement of road improvement was not random. Therefore, it uses a difference in 
difference framework that controls for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the 
household and village level. It also controls for initial characteristics of the study area 
(likely to be correlated with time variant unobserved heterogeneity) that may have affected 
the Local Government Engineering Department's decision to improve roads and 
                                                           
1 RDP improved 47 feeder roads of type B (FRB) (that connected to growth center markets) to bitumen 
surfaced standard that were passable by a motorized vehicle (e.g. bus) pre-project. RDP also involved 
construction of 3700 meters of culverts, and small bridges and improvement of the physical structure of shops 
and pathways within market areas. The effects of the project discussed represent the combined effects of 




households' decision to adopt HYV technology. The empirical analysis indicates that road 
improvement significantly increased acreage for HYV rice in areas that received road 




This chapter used BIDS survey data, which contains detailed data on household's 
acreage for crops during the past year and socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. In addition, it contains data on community characteristics, and input and 
output price of rice. This chapter supplements BIDS data with data on number of farms per 
extension worker using data from the Department of Agricultural Extension Ofiice in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. This paper also uses rainfall data 
from the Bangladesh Agricultural Resource Council as it is likely to affect households' 
acreage for HYV rice. Rainfall in a region is also likely to affect the condition of rural 
unpaved roads pre-road improvement and therefore likely to affect the road improvement 
placement decision made by LGED. Using the data from different sources mentioned 
above this chapter conducts the following empirical analysis. 
2.3 Estimation Framework 
It estimates the following equation first, which is called the base model. 
     (Equation 1)
 
ACK ijt denotes acreage for crop K={local rice, high-yielding variety rice, rice (sum of local 
and HYV rice)} by household i in village j at time t measured in decimals in BIDS data 
(100 decimals=1 acre). The variable Treatijt takes a value of 1 in both 1995-96 and 2000 
for households that received road improvement in 1996 and it takes a value of zero in both 
years for those that did not. The variable postijt takes a value of 0 for all households in 
1995-96 and takes a value of 1 for all households in round 2000. Therefore, the coefficient 
on the interaction variable gives the estimate of the impact of rural roads 
improvement on acreage for crops. represents household level fixed effects. 











(Binswanger et al., 1993; Khandker et al., 2006). These household level fixed effects 
control for time invariant unobserved effects that may be correlated with the variable 
 and ACk ijt as they affect households' technology adoption decision. 
Hijt represent a vector of controls (household observable characteristics that change 
over 
time) discussed as follows. A dummy variable indicating if any household member is 
member of any type of non-governmental organization (NGO). This variable indicates 
poverty status as NGOs choose poorest of the poor and provide access to credit needed to 
purchase inputs. NGOs provide access to social network, which Foster and Rosenzweig 
(1995) consider important for technology adoption. Therefore, NGO membership indicates 
access to information on HYV rice. Education of household head in household i in village 
j at time t. As household heads in Bangladesh age they delegate household headship to the 
eldest son. Therefore, although the same households appear in the two rounds education of 
the household head may be different in the two rounds. Higher level of education of 
household head enhances access to information about the proportion of seeds, fertilizer, 
and pesticides and acreage for HYV rice needed for efficient production. Household size 
of household i in village j at time t. Household size can affect acreage decisions because 
labor markets in rural areas do not function well. Therefore having a bigger household 
enhances the opportunity of increasing labor and hence acreage. Proportion of household 
in age range 0-5, 6-13, 14-35, 36-59, and 60 and over in household i in village j at time t: 
High proportion of members in the age range 14-35, and 36-59 can increase the number of 
people working on agricultural production.  is the error term. 
To correct for the fact that the model expressed in Equation 1 does not control for 
village 
level time variant observed or unobserved characteristics that may affect road placement 
decisions and HYV technology adoption decision, this paper estimates Equation 2. The 
model in Equation 2 controls for village level time variant observable characteristics 
denoted using Vijt, and village and household level time variant unobserved characteristics 
denoted by  and . As time variant observed characteristics it controls for annual 







and intensity of agricultural extension services available to farms/households indicated by 
the number of households that an agricultural extension worker serves. The time varying 
unobservable characteristics may be correlated with rural road improvement and HYV 
technology adoption. Therefore, it needs to control for time varying unobservable 
heterogeneity to avoid omitted variables bias using the following specification: 
 
(Equation 2) 
Note first difference of Equation 2 over time yields the following equation: 
                  (Equation 3)
 
The change in time varying unobservable characteristics is likely to be correlated 
with pre-program village level characteristics. Therefore, to take change in time varying 
unobservable 
characteristics into account in Equation 3, this paper controls for pre-program household 
level characteristics like distance to union council, distance to “thana sadar" (sub-district 
center) and village level pre-program observable characteristics like and number of banks, 
number of schools, number of grocery and fertilizer shops in the sub-district, literacy rate 
of people over 7 years of age, and population density. 
2.4 Empirical Results and Conclusion 
The regression results for local, HYV and total rice acreage are presented in Table 
1. Column 1 in Table 1 presents the coefficients estimated using equation 1, Column 2 
presents the coefficients estimated using Equation 1 with additional village level observed 
time varying variables such as annual rainfall, village's access to electricity, and 
agricultural extension services. Column 3 presents the coefficients estimated using 
equation 3, the model that controls for all the variables in Equation 1 and also time varying 
observed village characteristics such as rainfall, electricity access, and agricultural 
extension services along with pre-program area characteristics. Table 1 indicates that rural 
road improvement has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on acreage for local 
rice. It also shows that rural road improvement has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on HYV rice and total rice acreage according to all the specifications in columns 1-















project households in 1995/96, which seems to be a credible change. The results indicate 
that total rice acreage increased significantly through significant increase in HYV rice 
acreage. 
This study checks whether the impact estimated for local and HYV rice acreage is 
robust in the sub-sample of roadside and remote households. It restricts the sample to 
include roadside project and control households that live within .2 km of the improved road 
or control road in non-project areas. Similarly, it also creates another sub-sample with 
remote project and control households that live a little over 1 km away from the improved 
road or control road in control areas. Table 2 shows that for roadside households, road 
improvement has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on local variety rice 
acreage, while it has a statistically significant positive impact on HYV rice acreage. 
However, for remote households we do not find a significant impact for either local or 
HYV acreage. This indicates that the gain in HYV acreage mostly occurred in roadside 
areas and that the remote households responded less to the improvement in roads.  
In the high-yielding variety technology adoption literature, it is noted that the 
wealthy farmers adopt high yielding variety before others because they are less likely to be 
credit constrained. It is also possible that wealthier households are less risk averse so when 
access to markets and information improve they adopt HYV rice. This chapter investigates 
whether the wealthy households are more likely to adopt as a result of road improvement. 
It uses the same specification as above but adds household wealth and an interaction term 
of household wealth and road improvement indicator to capture the impact of household 
wealth in project areas post road improvement on acreage for local and HYV rice. The 
coefficient estimates from this specification are shown in Panel II of Table 2. The 
coefficient of the interaction of household wealth and road improvement indicates that 
wealthier households in project areas post road improvement allocate significantly less land 
to local variety rice while they allocate significantly more land to HYV rice. This finding 
corroborates that wealthier households respond by substituting HYV acreage for local rice 
acreage. This chapter analyzes the impact of road improvement on acreage for non-rice 
crops and finds that households did not reduce acreage for non-rice crops to increase 
acreage for HYV rice.  
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The results suggest that, as roads improve, wealthier households adopt high yield 
variety, while poorer households may continue to grow local variety rice, due to lack of 
finances to buy HYV seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. It is possible that households choose 
to grow local variety and HYV rice in tandem to balance the risks associated growing HYV 
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Eq. 1 with 
rain elec exten 
(3) 
Eq. 3 with 
rain elec exten 
inital area characteristics 
Local variety  rice acreage    
Road impact -6.245 22.89 37.12 
 (22.77) (27.00) (38.78) 
NGO membership dummy 21.12 16.63 14.10 
 (16.39) (14.65) (12.36) 
Education of hh head 0.136 0.626 1.043 
 (1.624) (1.655) (1.483) 
HH size 5.797 5.421 6.165 
 (5.091) (5.075) (4.810) 
Constant -55.71*** -102.0** -9.099 
 (19.06) (41.07) (108.6) 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.011 0.033 0.059 
HYV rice acreage    
Road impact 64.22** 63.46** 156.5** 
 (30.78) (29.56) (67.50) 
NGO membership dummy -27.57 -25.04 -21.00 
 (28.38) (25.40) (21.30) 
Education of hh head -1.607 -1.446 -2.331 
 (4.137) (3.871) (3.813) 
HH size 27.01** 26.86** 23.10* 
 (12.79) (13.05) (12.91) 
Constant 10.10 2.663 -461.5** 
 (10.05) (37.68) (181.0) 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.102 
Total rice acreage    
Road impact 57.97** 86.35*** 193.6*** 
 (23.74) (26.36) (37.46) 
NGO membership dummy -6.444 -8.408 -6.902 
 (14.93) (13.97) (13.32) 
Education of hh head -1.471 -0.820 -1.287 
 (3.526) (3.275) (3.315) 
HH size 32.81*** 32.28*** 29.27*** 
 (10.17) (10.58) (10.63) 
Constant -45.61*** -99.36*** -470.6*** 
 (14.83) (31.26) (92.48) 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.074 0.083 0.138 
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Note: elec and exten represents extension services and electricity availability in 
village rain represents rainfall in area and HH represents household. 
*** significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent 
Standard errors clustered at the village level. 
 
 
Table 2: Robustness Check for Impact of Rural Road Development on Local and HYV rice 










Road impact -6.743 53.05 92.55** 76.14 
  (42.14) (57.72) (42.85) (53.45) 
Observations 739 339 739 339 
R-squared 0.062 0.074 0.105 0.101 
Panel II         
                                            Local                  HYV 
VARIABLES Eq. 1 with Eq. 3 Eq. 1 with Eq. 3 
  (rain elec exten)   (rain elec exten)   
Road impact 8.548 55.06 48.96** 107.4* 
  (29.20) (41.09) (22.92) (56.03) 
HH asset -6.60** -6.44** -0.627 -1.10 
  (2.53) (2.60) (1.98) (2.07) 
Road impact*HH 
asset 
-15.3*** -15.4*** 25.1** 25.0** 
  (4.61) (4.59) (11.5) (11.5) 
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 
R-squared 0.331 0.350 0.155 0.202 
Note: In Panel I, Column 1 and 3 present impact of road improvement on local and HYV rice 
when sample restricted to roadside households (who live within .2 km of road in project and 
control areas). Column 2 and 4 present impact of road improvement on local and HYV rice 
when sample restricted to remote households (who live a little  more than 1 km of road in 
project and control areas). In Panel II, Columns 1 and 3 show estimates from estimating 
equation 1 for local and HYV rice with added controls such as rainfall, electricity and 
extension availability, HH asset and interaction of HH asset and road impact indicator. In Panel 
II, Columns 2 and 4 show estimates from estimating equation 3 for local and HYV rice with 
added controls such as HH asset and interaction of HH asset and road impact indicator. *** 





Chapter 2: Is transport infrastructure development a blessing 
for the agricultural sector in the presence of imperfect 
markets?  
 
Rubaba Ali  
2.1 Introduction 
Rural transportation infrastructure development is an important development 
strategy in developing countries. Investment in transport infrastructure often constitutes a 
significant share of developing countries' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Global 
Economic Prospects, 2002) and 15-20 percent of the World Bank's lending portfolio 
(Khandker et al., 2009). For this reason, researchers have examined the effects of road 
infrastructure and transport capital investments in developing countries from a 
macroeconomic perspective by analyzing their effect on aggregate productivity (usually 
measured by GDP or Personal Income), output elasticity and productivity (Deichmann et. 
al, 2002; Morrison-Paul et. al, 2001; Lokshin & Yemtsov, 2003; Feltenstein and Ha, 1995). 
However, econometric analyses that relate aggregate investment in transportation 
infrastructure to broad measures of economic performance provide little evidence on the 
mechanism that shows what drives the observed economic impacts (Lakshmanan and 
Anderson, 2007).  
Previous research using micro-data from developing countries does not illustrate 
the mechanism by which road improvement can increase income (Jacoby and Minten, 
2009), raise consumption per capita (Khandker et al., 2006), and reduce poverty (Fan et 
al., 2000; Gibson and Rozelle, 2003; Warr, 2008). Earlier papers that provide suggestive 
evidence on how road improvement affects economic condition have shown that lower 
transportation costs enabled by road improvements reduce production costs and, in turn, 
the prices of goods and services (BIDS, 2004) and create economic opportunities by 
improving access to markets (Mu and van de Walle, 2007) and affect input and output 
prices of crops (Khandker et al. (2006), Minten and Kyle (1999)), which should affect 
13 
 
agricultural return. Change in agricultural return is likely to have a substantial impact on 
poverty reduction because the poor are concentrated in the agricultural sector of rural areas, 
where transportation infrastructure is most scarce.  
Road improvement also enhances opportunities for non-agricultural activities by 
improving access to markets. A big portion of the literature on the impact of access to roads 
analyzes its effect on either the agricultural sector (Antle (1983), Binswanger, Khandker 
and Rosenzweig (1993), Stifel and Minten (2008), Zhang and Fan (2004)) or the non-
agricultural sector (Yamauchi et. al (2011)). Another segment of this literature analyzes 
separately the impact of road improvements on agricultural sector and non-agricultural 
sector (Jacoby and Minten (2009), Khandker et. al (2009), Khandker and Koolwal (2011)) 
without analyzing how the improved activity in the non-agricultural sector may affect 
activity in the agricultural sector.  
Papers that analyze only agricultural sector or non-agricultural sector conduct 
partial equilibrium analysis, which ignores the interrelations of all the productive sectors, 
agricultural and non-agricultural of the economy. There exist market interactions and thus 
market feedbacks between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. As both the 
agricultural sector and non-agricultural sector use labor and capital as inputs, input demand 
in the agricultural sector is likely to affect pricing outcomes in nonagricultural sector and 
vice versa, these interactions can thus be expected to affect price-quantity equilibrium in 
these two sectors. To represent this complex set of economic relationships, it is necessary 
to go beyond partial equilibrium analysis and construct a model that considers both sectors 
simultaneously. To examine the overall effect of road improvement, a rural market 
equilibrium model is a suitable framework, as it can analyze interactions between the two 
sectors through their demand for constrained factor resources. So we used a rural market 
equilibrium framework to theoretically analyze how roads simultaneously affect input 
allocation in these two sectors and how the changes within each sector, in turn, affect the 
other. The modeling framework used in this study is specifically designed to analyze how 
transport cost reduction-by affecting credit access, wage and rent- impact each sector’s 
input allocation decision and, hence, productivity. Warr (2008) and Jacoby and Minten 
(2009) also use general equilibrium modeling to simulate the effect of upgrading roads or 
reducing transportation costs. However, their model assumes that markets function 
14 
 
perfectly, something which is not likely to hold in most developing countries. Their 
analyses, and others from previous literature in general, do not account for incomplete labor 
and credit markets and how, in such a situation, road improvement can affect interactions 
between the agricultural and non-agricultural sector and competition for factor inputs, and 
how that in turn can affect agricultural and non-agricultural output. This chapter attempts 
to fill that void.  It focuses on the improvement in roads that connect rural growth center 
markets and local amenities such as banks, extension services, and additional markets in 
nearby villages but not necessarily roads that allow more access to world markets.  
Most previous research estimates the effects of road improvement using reduced 
form estimation strategies, which do not allow these studies to analyze the mechanism by 
which roads can affect the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and how changes in 
these two sectors occur simultaneously to ultimately affect agricultural and non-
agricultural output and income and poverty in general. Jacoby and Minten (2009), 
Khandker and Koolwal (2011), and Khandker, Bakht, Koolwal (2009), using reduced form 
estimation strategies, analyzed both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, but did not 
consider interaction between them. Khandker and Koolwal (2011), and Khandker, Bakht, 
Koolwal (2009) analyze the impact of road improvement on agricultural output and labor 
supply, but do not estimate the effect of roads on access to credit in agricultural and non-
agricultural as was analysed in this chapter. Their results do not inform how road access 
affects demand for labor in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors jointly to affect 
equilibrium wages, and how road access, through its effect on input prices, affect labor 
allocation decisions and other input choices, which ultimately affect agricultural output.  
Most previous papers find a positive impact of roads on agricultural output (Antle 
(1983), Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig (1993), Khandker et. al (2009), Stifel and 
Minten (2008), Zhang and Fan (2004)), with the exception of Khandker and Koolwal 
(2011). However, none of these papers explicitly account for the fact that in developing 
countries labor and capital/credit markets are imperfect. In such a case, road improvement 
may affect access to credit in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector differently. For 
instance, if the agricultural sector owns more land than the non-agricultural sector, then the 
enhancement of the value of collateral may be greater for the agricultural sector, leading to 
a greater increase in the supply of credit to this sector. However, if the potential/perceived 
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improvement in  non-agricultural return is higher than that in the agricultural sector, then 
the lending agencies may promote non-agricultural ventures by supplying more credit to 
this sector. This differential effect of road improvement on access to credit in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sector may affect the change in demand for labor and 
capital in these two sectors, and hence it can affect agricultural and non-agricultural output. 
This chapter attempts to fill that void by explicitly accounting for the fact that markets are 
imperfect in developing countries.  
This paper first analyzes the effect of a road improvement on agricultural 
productivity using a theoretical model that assumes that markets are imperfect markets. 
The model helps derive scenarios, (related to relative credit elasticity in the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors and elasticity of total stock of labor and capital in the rural 
market), under which agricultural productivity will be enhanced or deteriorated when 
markets are imperfect. The theoretical model predicts that in the short run, if the elasticity 
of access to credit (as road quality changes) in the agricultural sector is lower than that in 
the non-agricultural sector then the agricultural productivity will decrease after road 
improvement. Otherwise, rural road improvement can be expected to lead to improvement 
in agricultural productivity. In addition, using a rural market equilibrium framework 
theoretical model shows that when markets are perfect, agricultural return is non-
decreasing in road improvement. The theoretical model show that when markets are 
imperfect, agricultural return may be non-decreasing or increasing depending on the 
relative elasticity of access to credit with respect to roads in agricultural and non-
agricultural markets. It further finds that in the long-run when stock of capital and labor 
are allowed to change, the effect of road improvement on agricultural output is ambiguous 
both under perfect and imperfect market conditions.  
Using panel data for the years 1997, 2000, and 2005 from Bangladesh this chapter 
evaluates how Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and Maintenance Project 
(RRMIMP), which improved feeder roads connecting growth center markets, affected 
access to credit. In addition, it examined whether the elasticity of access to credit with 
respect to road quality is different for agricultural and non-agricultural households. Under 
RRMIMP, some roads in some areas were improved between 1997 and 2000, and some 
16 
 
areas were improved between 2000 and 2005. As the dataset used for the empirical analysis 
collected data in 1997, 2000 and 2005, it was possible to estimate short term effects for 
those households (Project 1 households) in areas that received road improvement between 
1997 and 2000, and also those households (Project 2 households) in areas that received 
road improvement between 1997 and 2000. The empirical analysis estimated the long-term 
effect for those households that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000 but 
was also observed in 2005.  Empirical analysis indicates that road improvement increased 
access to credit significantly but there is weak evidence that the elasticity of access to credit 
is lower for the agricultural sector. It finds that as a result of road improvement land value 
increased significantly, which suggests that access to credit may have increased as a result 
of enhancement of value of collateral. The analysis further indicates that land value 
increased less for agricultural households than non-agricultural households, and that the 
interest rate paid among agricultural households is higher relative to non-agricultural 
households post improvement in improved areas. These are possible explanations behind 
the empirical finding in this chapter that, in some cases, agricultural households’ access to 
credit increased less than that of non-agricultural households post road improvement.  
Section 2.2 presents the theoretical model. Section 2.3 presents the empirical model. 
Section 2.4 presents a data description. Section 2.5 presents results from empirical analysis. 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Model  
Studies that analyze the mechanisms through which road infrastructure impact 
production in the agricultural sector in developing countries are scarce largely due to 
inferior quality of data. Previous works ((BIDS, 2004), Mu and van de Walle, (2007), 
Khandker et al. (2006), Minten and Kyle (1999)) provide suggestive evidence, but 
nevertheless, an incomplete picture of the mechanism by which road infrastructure affects 
the economies of developing countries. There are a number of ways that road infrastructure 
improvement may affect agricultural output/productivity as discussed below.  
17 
 
Increasing agricultural productivity in rural areas of developing countries is an 
ongoing challenge due to limited access to credit. Road infrastructure improvement 
increases access to finance by increasing borrowers’ access to banks and financial 
institutions and lowering banks’ operation costs, encouraging them to expand lending 
(World Development report (1994)) for both agricultural and non-agricultural activity. In 
addition, road improvement increases the value of land (Jacoby, 2000), which borrowers 
can use as collateral to obtain loans (Gonzalez-Navarro, and Quintana-Domequ, 2010). 
This suggests that as roads are improved, farmers are likely to have more credit to buy 
inputs that enhance yield.  
Labor market imperfections, arising from moral hazard problem since effort 
employed by hired labor in the agricultural sector is not easily verifiable, impose 
restrictions on the expansion of agricultural production. As effort employed by hired labor 
in the non-agricultural sector tends to be more easily verifiable than in the agricultural 
sector, when roads improve and people have better access to finance they may choose to 
expand production in the non-agricultural sector and hire labor for this sector, because they 
will pay a lower effective wage. Improved access to credit may thus encourage substitution 
of labor away from agricultural sector employment, and into non-agricultural sector 
employment, leading to lower use of labor in the agricultural sector due to improved non-
agricultural activity. Studies in Sri Lanka (Gunasekara, Anderson, and Lakshmanan, 2008) 
Cameroon (Gachassin, Najman and Raballand, 2010), India (Fan et. al, 2000) and Vietnam 
(Mu and van de Walle, 2007) find that access to good quality roads fostered a shift away 
from land-intensive and labor-intensive occupations in the agricultural sector, and toward 
skilled employment outside the agricultural and forestry sector.  
Labor markets are incomplete in developing countries. Therefore, in peak periods 
(such as during weeding or harvesting), labor is scarce and cannot be hired in or out (as all 
family labor is tied up). Increased non-agricultural employment due to road improvement 
can increase the wage that the agricultural sector has to pay, which can potentially hurt 
agriculture. Similarly, increased non-agricultural sector activity due to road improvements 
may induce reallocation of capital and land from the agricultural to non-agricultural sector, 
which can further affect agricultural sector output/productivity. But the households may 
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compensate by intensifying agricultural production through high yield variety (HYV) 
technology adoption. Ali (2010) finds that road improvement influenced households in 
Bangladesh to adopt HYV rice technology by improving access to markets and extension 
services, thus significantly reducing cost of accessing market purchased inputs for HYV 
rice. Therefore, the impact of roads on agricultural productivity and output is ambiguous.  
By changing the price of labor, capital and inputs in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, we expect roads to affect labor and capital allocation decision across 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors simultaneously. In addition, road improvement 
may change total stock of capital and labor available in the market in the long-run as road 
improvements allow easier access to and from the areas that receive road improvement. To 
analyze the overall impact of road improvement on allocation decision across sectors we 
used a rural equilibrium framework and examined both short-run and long-run effects. In 
the rural equilibrium framework, we assumed that there are two productive sectors in the 
economy: the non-agricultural sector and agricultural sector.  
The non-agricultural sector produces only one type of good, which uses capital and 
labor and, as in the agricultural sector, has a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the 
non-agricultural sector, hired labor does not have to be monitored. This sector faces 
borrowing constraints and hence the money that it can spend on rent payment for capital 
and wage payment for hired labor is bound by the credit available for this sector. Therefore, 
the non-agricultural sector maximizes its profit subject to the borrowing constraint and 
solves the following problem.  
In the expression below, ( )A R represents the total factor productivity of non-agricultural 
production and, the total factor productivity is directly affected by road quality change. The 
terms NL  and NK  represent capital and labor applied to non-agricultural production. The 
terms 1δ and 2δ represent the factor intensities of labor and capital in production in the 
non-agricultural sector. The terms w  and rrepresent the market wage rate for labor and 
rental rate for capital. In the borrowing constraint shown below ( )N Ry  represents credit 
available to the non-agricultural sector. The wage payment and rent for capital in the non-
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agricultural will be bound by the fund available to this sector, which is likely to be a 
summation of savings/income and access to credit. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that the wage payment and rent for capital in the non-agricultural sector is constrained by 
access to credit.   
 
 
                                     Expression (1) 
 
 
The first order conditions for the non-agricultural sector are as follows:  
1 21
1: ( ) (1 ),  N N NA R L K wL




2: ( ) (1 )N N NA R L K rK
δ δδ η− ≤ +  
: ( ) 0N NAy R wL rKη − − ≥  
The termη  represents the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint.  
Assuming equality in the first order conditions we get that the demand for capital and labor 

























higher the amount of money available to the non-ag. sector, the higher is the demand for 
capital and labor. The higher the price of each input the lower is the demand for such inputs. 
The demand for each input rises with its factor intensity, relative to the other input.  
 
The agricultural sector grows two types of crops: local traditional variety and high yielding 
variety (HYV). The agricultural sector uses labor and capital for production. The 





N N N NK L
Max A R L K wL rK
δ δ − −
s.t ( ) 0N N Ny R wL rK− − ≥
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agricultural output is dependent on weather, the effort exerted by labor is observable but 
not verifiable. Therefore, the agricultural sector has to monitor labor that it hires. I assume 
that this sector hires labor to grow local and HYV technology. We assume that the 
agricultural sector has a Cobb-Douglas production function.    
We can say that the agriculture sector solves the following problem denoted by 
expression (2). Note that in the expression below, tL and hL denote labor applied to growing 
traditional and HYV crops respectively. tK  and hK denote capital applied to growing 
traditional and HYV crops respectively. ( )B R  represents the total factor productivity in 
the production of HYV crops. It is a function of ,R which denotes roads and hence the total 
factor productivity is directly affected by changes in road quality. Traditional crops use 
home produced inputs, so the improvement in market access is less likely to directly affect 
productivity, although market access improvement has the potential to affect traditional 
crop production due to change in factor prices due to improved market access. If there is 
competition for labor and capital, then the agricultural sector may increase production of 
HYV, which intensifies production through the usage of fertilizer and pesticides and rely 
less on the use of labor and capital. The terms 1α  and 2α  represent factor intensity of labor 
and capital in traditional variety crops production, while 1β , and 2β represent factor 
intensity of labor and capital in HYV crops production respectively. The termφ  represents 
the fraction of labor that needs to be applied to monitor hired labor in growing local and 
HYV crops. Note that the labor applied to monitor labor does not produce any output other 
than to ensure that the hired laborers do not shirk. The terms w  and r represent the market 
wage rate for labor and rental rate for capital applied to production.  
1 2 1 2
, , ,
 ( ) ( )(1 ) ( )
t t h h
t t t th h h h
K L K L
Max L K B R L K w L L r K Kα α β β φ+ − + + − +




s.t ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) 0t tA h hy R w L L r K Kφ− + + − + ≥
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In the inequality representing the budget constraint above, ( )Ay R represents the amount of 
credit available to the agricultural sector, which is a function of roads and therefore changes 
directly as a result of road quality change. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
wage payment and rent for capital in the agricultural sector is constrained by access to 
credit.   Note that 1 2t t tY L K
α α= represents output per unit of land for traditional crops and
1 2( )h h hY B R L K
β β=  represents output per unit of land for HYV crops.  
 
The first order conditions for the agricultural sector are as follows:  
1 21
1: (1 )(1 )t t tL L K w
α αα φ λ− ≤ + +  
1 2 1
2: (1 )t t tK L K r
α αα λ− ≤ +  
1 21
1: ( ) (1 )(1 )h h hL B R L K w
β ββ φ λ− ≤ + +  
1 2 1
2: ( ) (1 )h h hK B R L K r
β ββ λ− ≤ +  
: ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) 0t tA h hy R w L L r K Kλ φ− + + − + ≥  
If 0tL > and 0hL > then 1 2 1 2
1 1
1 1 ( )t t h hL K B R L K
α α β βα β− −= and  
if 0tK > and 0hK > then 1 2 1 2
1 1
2 2 ( )t t h hL K B R L K
α α β βα β− −=  
The term λ  represents the lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint. 
 
Note that there are three possible cases for the agricultural sector: 
Case 1: Agricultural sector grows local traditional only. (This occurs in the case where 
marginal product of capital when applied to traditional crops outweigh that when applied 
to HYV crops, similarly, marginal product of labor when applied to traditional crops 
outweigh that when applied to HYV crops).   
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Case 2: Agricultural sector grows HYV only. (This happens in the case where marginal 
product of capital and labor when applied to HYV crops outweigh that when applied to 
traditional crops).   
Case 3: Agricultural sector grows both local and HYV. This happens when marginal 
product of capital and labor when applied to HYV crops equals that when applied to 
traditional crops. 
 
The rural market clearing conditions for capital and labor are: 
( )t h NK K K K R+ + =  
( )(1 ) ( )t h NL L L L Rφ+ + + =   
It needs to be noted that the total stock of capital ( ( )K R ) and labor ( ( )L R ) is assumed to 
be functions of roads only. This assumption is made with the logic that the wage differential 
between rural and urban areas will always exist but whether labor in the rural areas can 
migrate en mass between rural and urban areas and thus change total stock of labor in rural 
areas is determined by the transportation cost (and hence road quality) between urban and 
rural areas. Similar logic applies to the stock of capital as well.  
We consider three possible scenarios related to change in stock of capital and labor in the 















, that is, total stock of capital and labor remains 
constant after road improvement.  
It is possible that when roads improve, in the short run, the stock of capital and labor does 
not change immediately, i.e. ( )K R K=  and ( )L R L=  
or equivalently, 
( ) ( )
0.
dK R dL R
dR dR
= =  
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, that is, both total stock of capital and labor 
increases post road improvement.  
This scenario might occur as roads lead to greater productivity in the rural areas post road 
improvement and thus attract more labor and capital in the rural sector, and now that the 















 that is, total stock of capital increases but total 
stock of labor decreases in the rural areas post road improvement. 
This scenario might occur as roads lead to greater productivity in the rural areas post road 
improvement and thus attract more capital in the rural sector, and now that the 
transportation cost is lower, capital may flow more easily to the rural areas. The 
productivity of labor in the urban areas may still be so much higher than in the rural areas 
that once the transportation cost decreases post road improvement, labor migrates to urban 
areas, hence, decreasing stock of labor in the rural market.   
 
Possible Equilibrium Outcomes in the Agricultural sector: 
 
Case 1: Assuming equality in the first order conditions for , ,t tL K  and λ we get the 
demand for capital and labor allocated for traditional crop production in the agricultural 





















φ α α= + +
. The higher the amount of money 
available to the ag sector, the higher is the demand for capital and labor. The higher the 
prices of each input the lower is the demand for such input. The demand for each input 
rises with its factor intensity, relative to the other input. Note that the demand for capital 
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in the agricultural sector is greater than the demand for capital in the non-agricultural sector 
as long as the amount of credit available to the agricultural sector multiplied by the relative 
capital to labor factor intensity in this sector exceeds its counterpart in the non-ag sector.  
Note that the effective wage in the agricultural sector ( (1 )w φ+ ) is greater than the wage in 
the non-agricultural sector (w).  




( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
y Ry R
NAr
K R K R
α δ







( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
y Ry R
NAw
L R L R
α δ




For derivation see appendix. 
 
Observation 1: Equilibrium factor input price in rural market is positively related to the 
amount of money available to the agricultural and non-agricultural sector and negatively 
related to the stock of factor available in the market. Each input price is positively related 
to its factor intensity relative to that of the other input, in both the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors..  
 
Scenario A: ( )K R K=  and ( )L R L= and therefore, ( ) ( ) 0,dK R dL R
dR dR
= =  
Note that under this scenario, as long as ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN
 is non-decreasing with road 
















Under this scenario, even if ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN
 is non-decreasing with road 
improvement, rent may increase, decrease or remain the same depending on the relative 
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change in ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN
and ( )K R . Similarly, wage may increase decrease or 
remain the same depending on the relative change in ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN

















Under this scenario, even if ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN
 is non-decreasing with road 
improvement, rent may increase decrease or remain the same depending on the relative 
change in ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN
and ( )K R . Under this scenario if ( )Ay R  and ( )y RN
 is 








Lemma 1: Road improvement will increase (decrease) the demand for input (capital and 
labor) applied to traditional crop production if and only if the elasticity of credit access 
with respect to the road quality available to the agricultural sector is higher (lower) than 
that available in the non-agricultural sector minus elasticity of input stock weighted by the 
inverse of the relative use of input in the non-agricultural sector. 




≥  if and only if 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
     ∂∂ ∂≥ − +     ∂ ∂ ∂    
 




≥  if and only if 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ








The effect of road improvement on capital and labor usage for traditional crops post road 
improvement under the three possible scenarios related to change in stock of capital and 
















In this scenario A, 0t
dK
dR





y Ry R R R
R y R y R
 ∂∂ ≥  ∂ ∂ 









y Ry R R R




Note that this implies that 0 and 0t t
dR dR
dK dL≥ ≥ if and only if the elasticity of credit 
available to the agricultural sector is greater than the elasticity of credit available to the 
non-agricultural sector.  
 





y Ry R R R
R y R y R
∂∂
∂ ∂
< then 0 and 0t t
dR dR
dK dL< < . 
This implies that if the elasticity of credit access in the agricultural sector with respect to 
road quality is less than the elasticity of credit access in the non-agricultural sector then 
road improvement will lead to decrease in equilibrium labor and capital quantity demanded 
for production of traditional crops.  
 
 
Under this scenario, given the market clearing condition for capital ( t NK K K+ = ) and 
labor ( t NL L L+ = ), we know that N tdK dK
dR dR
= − ,  and (1 )N tdL dL
dR dR




























y Ry R R R
R y R y R
∂∂
∂ ∂
= then quantity of capital and labor 
demanded for traditional crops (i.e. for agriculture) and hence quantity of capital and labor 



















Please note that for the same elasticities of access to credit in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors across scenarios A, and B, under scenario B 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
     ∂∂ ∂≥ − +     ∂ ∂ ∂    
 and 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥  are more likely to hold than 





≥ are more likely to hold than under 
scenario B holding the elasticity in access to credit in agri. and non-agri. sectors constant 
across the two scenarios.  
Under this scenario, 









, therefore, even if 
capital and labor applied to the agricultural sector increases it is still possible that capital 
and labor applied to the non-agricultural sector also increases. This, result is contrary to 










, and therefore, if 
capital and labor applied to agricultural sector increases post road improvement under 
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scenario A then it must be the case that capital and labor applied to the non-agricultural 

















For the same credit elasticities across scenarios, under scenario (C), Condition (i) is more 
likely to hold than under scenario A and so 0t
dK
dR
≥ is more likely to hold under scenario 
(C) than under scenario (A). However, Condition (ii) is less likely to hold under scenario 






y Ry R R R
R y R y R
∂∂
∂ ∂
< then under this scenario 0tdK
dR




< will also hold.  
 





y Ry R R R
R y R y R
∂∂
∂ ∂












capital usage for traditional crops will increase but labor usage for traditional crops will 
decrease post road improvement.  
  
This implies that if the elasticity of credit access with respect to road quality in the 
agricultural sector is equal to that in the non-agricultural while stock of capital increases 
and stock of labor decreases in the rural market then road improvement will lead to 
decrease in quantity of labor demand but increase in quantity of capital demanded for 
production of traditional crops.  
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may be positive but if 0t
dL
dR
≥ then it 





Proposition 1: The output in the agricultural sector (in this case output of traditional 
crops) will increase if the elasticity of agricultural sector’s credit access with respect to 
the road quality is higher than that in the non-agricultural sector minus elasticity of input 
(capital and labor) stock weighted by the inverse of relative use of input in non-agricultural 
sector. If the elasticity of agricultural sector’s credit access with respect to the road quality 
is less than that in the non-agricultural sector minus the weighted change in input stocks 
with respect to road change, then the effect of road improvement on agricultural output is 
ambiguous.  
 
More formally, if 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥ and 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R




≥ .  
 
If it is the case that 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
<  and 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R












≥  or 0tdY
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< may hold. 




















The output in the agricultural sector (in this case output of traditional crops) will increase 
(decrease) with road improvement if and only if the elasticity of credit access in the 
agricultural sector with respect to the road quality is higher (lower) than the elasticity of 


















Under this scenario, if elasticities of access to credit in the ag and non-ag sector are the 
same post road improvement, output of traditional crops (i.e. agricultural output) will 



















































Under this scenario, even if elasticities of access to credit in the agriculture and non-
agriculture sector are the same post road improvement, output of traditional crops (i.e. 
















































then under this scenario labor usage for traditional crops 
will decrease but capital usage for traditional crops will increase post road improvement. 
This implies that agricultural ouput may increase, decrease or remain the same. However, 


























then under this scenario 0, 0t t
dY dY
dR dR


























φ β β= + + .  
It can be shown that the rent for capital and wage for labor in the labor market are as follows 




1 2 1 2
,
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NAy R y R
K R K R
r
β δ
β β δ δ++ +=
 
1 1
1 2 1 2
.
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NAy R y R
L R L R
w
β δ





Note that the demands for inputs and the rent and wage in this case are analogous to that 
for Case 1.  
Observation 2: Equilibrium factor input price in rural market is positively related to the 
amount of money available to the agricultural and non-agricultural sector and negatively 
related to the stock of input available in the market. Each input price is positively related 
to the factor intensity of that input relative to that of the other input in both the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors.  
 
Note that all the points noted about Observation 1 also applies to Observation 2.  
 
Lemma 2: Road improvement will increase (decrease) the demand for inputs (capital and 
labor) applied to HYV crop production if and only if the elasticity of access to credit with 
respect to the road quality available to the agricultural sector is higher (lower) than that 
in the non-agricultural sector minus elasticity of input stock in the rural market weighted 
by the inverse of the relative use of input in the non-agricultural sector.  




≥  if and only if 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
     ∂∂ ∂≥ − +     ∂ ∂ ∂    
 
(Condition i) and 0h
dL
dR
≥ if and only if 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥ (Condition ii) .  
See proof in the appendix. 
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Please note that the interpretations of the conditions in Lemma 2 are analogous to the 
interpretations of the conditions in Lemma 1. Similarly, all the points made for Lemma 1 
under Scenarios A, B, and C also apply here.    
Proposition 2: The output in the agricultural sector (in this case output of HYV crops) will 
increase if the elasticity of agricultural sector’s credit access with respect to the road 
quality is higher than that in the non-agricultural sector minus elasticity of input (capital 
and labor) stock in the rural market weighted by the inverse of the relative use of inputs in 
the non-agricultural sector. If the elasticity of ag-sector’s credit access with respect to the 
road quality is less than that in the non-agricultural sector minus the weighted change in 
input stocks, then the effect of road improvement on agricultural output is ambiguous.  
 
More formally, if 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥ and 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R




≥ .  
 
If it is the case that 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
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Case 3: Assuming equality of the first order conditions for , , , ,t t h hL K L K  and λ and 
assuming 1 2 1 2α α β β+ = + 2 and setting marginal product of labor in traditional crop 
production equal to marginal product of labor in HYV crop production we get, 
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Diversification Condition under imperfect market: 
If 2 2
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> − + 
 then tK ,
tL , hK hL , NK , NL  are all greater than zero.  
Please see appendix for derivation. 
Please note that whether the agricultural sector produces both types of crops, traditional 
and HYV and the non-agricultural sector produces non-zero output depends on the 
                                                           
2 1 2 1 2α α β β+ = +  is a condition that implies that the sum of factor intensity of labor and 
capital in local traditional crop production equals the sum of factor intensity of labor and 
capital in HYV crop production. 
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elasticity of access to credit, input prices, factor intensities and stock of inputs in the rural 
market. 
 
Lemma 3: If 
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Proposition 3: If  
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−
+
− , then the output 
in the agricultural sector increases for sure or else the agricultural output may increase 
or decrease or remain the same with road improvement.   




Corollary 1: When markets are imperfect, roads have an ambiguous effect on 
agricultural output and the impact of roads on agricultural output is dependent on the 
relative access of credit in agricultural and non-agricultural sector and elasticity of stock 
of capital and labor with respect to roads and the relative use of capital and labor in the 
non-agricultural sector.  
Simply follows from Propositions 1 and 2 and 3. 
Perfect Market Scenario: So far the model represented the scenario where capital and 
labor markets do not function properly. But in the case where these markets function 
properly the term λ  and η , which represent the lagrange multipliers associated with the 
borrowing constraints in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector are equal to zero and 
the cost of monitoring (φ) in terms of labor needed to monitor hired labor in the agricultural 
sector is zero. In this scenario too, the agricultural sector may have three solutions: (1) 
agricultural sector grows only local traditional crops, (2) it grows only HYV crops, and (3) 
agricultural sector grows both local and traditional crops. In the perfect market scenario for 
case (1), the rural market equilibrium amount of labor and capital applied in production in 
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In the perfect market scenario for case (2), the rural market equilibrium amount of labor 
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In the perfect market scenario for case (3), the rural market equilibrium amount of labor 
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   =       
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In this model we assume that the relative capital intensity of HYV agricultural production 
is greater than relative capital intensity of traditional agricultural production and that the 
relative capital intensity of non-agricultural production is higher than the relative capital 
intensity of HYV agricultural production.  
Therefore, for the diversification to occur under perfect markets the following condition 
needs to hold: 
( )( )
( ) ( ).
( 1)
L R bd a





















i.e. ( )K R K= and  ( )L R L=  
Under Scenario A, in the short run, 
w
r
does not change with change in road quality 
implying that , , , , ,t t h h N N
dL dK dL dK dL dK
dR dR dR dR dR dR
are all equal to zero in the short-run. This 
implies that in the perfect market scenario, the output in the non-agricultural sector grows 
at the rate of growth in total factor productivity and the output in the agricultural sector 
does not grow at all in case 1, while the output in the agricultural sector grows at the rate 
of growth in total factor productivity of the HYV crop production. This shows that with 
perfect markets and rural market equilibrium, agricultural return is non-decreasing in road 
improvement, while with imperfect markets and rural market equilibrium, agricultural 
return may be non-decreasing or increasing depending on the relative elasticity of access 
to credit with respect to roads in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.    
39 
 





























agricultural output may increase, decrease or remain the same depending on the relative 
change in stock of capital and labor.  
Comparing results from imperfect market scenario and perfect market scenario it can be 
said that under imperfect markets the effect of road improvement on agricultural output is 
more likely to be ambiguous than under perfect markets. This is because, under perfect 
markets the output depends on stock of capital and labor and relative factor intensities, 
while under imperfect markets, the output depends relative elasticity of access to credit in 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, on stock of capital and labor and relative factor 
intensities, which adds two more variables that affect agricultural output and hence 







Summary and intuition behind results from the model:  
We assume that road improvement improves access to credit for both agricultural and non-
agricultural sector and therefore, both sectors will want to increase production for which 
they will need to use more input. In the short-run, the amount of capital and labor stock 
available in the market are fixed and the two sectors compete for capital and labor. So the 
sector that has a greater percentage increase in credit can offer a greater wage and capital 
allowing that sector to increase capital and labor and causing the other sector to reduce 
labor and capital as the inputs in the market are fixed in the short-run.  
In case 1, if capital and labor used are increased then the agricultural output increases and 
if capital and labor are decreased then the agricultural output decreases. In case 2, if 
capital and labor are increased then the agricultural output increases. However, if labor 
and capital applied to HYV production in the agricultural sector decreases, the 
agricultural output may increase, or remain the same, (unlike in case 1) or decrease. 
Because the roads also directly affect the total factor productivity, if the increase in total 
factor productivity is big enough to overpower the effect of the decrease in capital and 
labor on agricultural output, then the agricultural output may increase when input usage 
by the agricultural sector decreases. If the increase in total factor productivity is not big 
enough to overpower the effect of the decrease in capital and labor on agricultural output, 
then the agricultural output will decrease when quantity of capital and labor demanded by 
the agricultural sector decreases with road improvement. 
 
But in the long-run, the stock of capital and labor in the rural market may change. If the 
stocka of labor and capital increase but the elasticity of access to credit for agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors remain the same in long-run and short-run, then it is more 
likely in the long run than in the short-run that agricultural output/productivity will 
increase. In the short-run when only traditional crops are produced, both agricultural and 
non-agricultural output cannot increase with road improvement.  However, in the long-
run, it is possible that output in agricultural sector and non-agricultural sector both 




In the long-run, if stock of capital increases but stock of labor decreases in the rural 
market, then the effect of road improvement on both agricultural and non-agricultural 
output becomes ambiguous.  Under this scenario, post road improvement, both sectors 
have access to more credit so they could increase output by applying more capital and 
labor but only capital stock has increased while labor stock decreased. Therefore, it is 
possible that they substitute away from labor and use more capital in production, which 
can further increase the rent for capital and thus depending on the relative elasticity in 
access to credit in the two sectors and the relative factor intensities in the two sectors, the 
labor and capital applied to agricultural production may increase, decrease or remain the 
same, thus making the effect of road improvement on agricultural output ambiguous.  
 
Under perfect markets assumption, in the short-run, both agricultural and non-agricultural 
output remains constant but in the long-run the effect of road improvement on agriculture 
under different scenarios can be summarized in the following table. The table shows that 
in the long-run (under scenario B), the effect of road improvement may be positive, 
negative or equal to zero under all three cases 1, 2, and 3. However, in the long-run 
(under scenario C) and Case 1 the output will decrease, in the long-run (under scenario C) 
and Case 2 the output change depends on the relative change in the inputs, capital and 
labor, and the relative change in the total factor productivity post road improvement. In 
the long-run (under scenario C) and Case 3, the output will increase.  
 
Tables 2A and 2B shown below summarizes the effect of road improvement on 







Table 2A: Effect of road improvement on agricultural output under perfect markets as 





















same Depends  Decrease 






same Depends  Depends 








same Depends  Increase 
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Table 2 B: Effect of road improvement on agricultural output under imperfect markets as 
predicted by the model (if elasticity of access to credit in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors are the same) 
 
Type of crop 
grown 
 











traditional only  same increase depends 
        
HYV only increase  increase  depends 






2.3 Empirical Model  
 
As the model predicts, the effect of road improvement on agricultural productivity depends 
on the relative elasticity of credit with respect to road quality in agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors along with the change in stock of capital and labor in the rural market 
due to road improvement. In order to estimate the effect of road quality improvement on 
agricultural sector in the presence of market imperfections, we empirically estimate the 
effect of roads on access to credit and especially examine whether the elasticity of access 
to credit with respect to road improvement is different across the two sectors and which 
sector has the higher elasticity in a developing country. This will allow us to examine the 
effect of roads on agricultural output under different scenarios related to change in stock 
of land and capital in the rural market. Using data from Bangladesh for the years 1997, 
2000 and 2005, which is described in greater detail in the data section, we examined the 
effect of a rural road improvement project, also discussed in the data section. It is important 
to note that in rural settings in Bangladesh both agricultural and non-agricultural 
productions occur in small scale and is mostly carried out by households. For this reason, 
we conducted the empirical analysis at the household level and examined the elasticity for 
agricultural households and non-agricultural households with the assumption that 
agricultural/non-agricultural households’ access to credit represents agricultural/non-
agricultural sector’s access to credit. In the data used for analysis in this chapter, 
households are more likely to grow either only local or only high yield variety crops than 
grow both traditional and HYV crops3, therefore, we empirically examined the elasticity 
of access to credit in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to predict the effect of roads 
on agricultural productivity under different scenarios related to stock of capital and labor 
specified in the theoretical model section.  
                                                           
3 Please note that in the data used for the analysis, in 1997 31% of the households surveyed grow only high 
yield variety crops, 22 percent grow only local variety rice and 5% grow both local and high yield variety 
crops. In 2000, 30 % of the households surveyed grow only high yield variety crops, 8 percent grow only 
local variety rice and 1% grow both local and high yield variety crops. In 2005, 44% of the households 
surveyed grow only high yield variety crops, 13 percent grow only local variety rice and 2% grow both 




Credit is likely to be affected by access to commercial and agricultural banks, and other 
financial institutions, as well as friends and relatives (that can serve as loan sources) and 
therefore, road improvement is likely to affect access to credit. The following equation 
summarizes the factors that are likely to affect credit access and helps in explaining why 
we use the variables that were used in the empirical analysis: ( , )Credit F R H= .  The 
equation shows that whether households borrow and the amount borrowed is a function of 
roads and household characteristics. Road improvement can directly affect the likelihood 
of borrowing and the amount borrowed by improving access to loans sources and indirectly 
by affecting income. Income is likely to affect access to credit as it may be easier for people 
with more income to get loans. However, as income is endogenous, i.e. credit and income 
are jointly affected by roads, we need to account for predetermined income (i.e. income 
from previous periods), which is likely to affect access to credit but income in previous 
period and credit in current period are not jointly affected by road improvement.  
If the roads are not placed randomly, then there will be factors that affect both road 
improvement placement decision and the borrowing behavior of households in those areas. 
These factors may be time invariant or time varying. Therefore, using panel data and a 
difference in difference framework that controls for time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity at the household and village level shown in Equation (1) we empirically 
examine the relationship between road improvement and access to credit. In addition, we 
control for the interaction between time dummy and initial characteristics of the study area 
that may have affected the Local Government Engineering Department's decision 
regarding which roads to improve and households' access to credit. We control for these 
above mentioned interaction terms as they are likely to be correlated with time variant 
unobserved heterogeneity that are correlated with road improvement and credit access. 
The following equation, Equation (1) captures the empirical estimation strategy adopted 
for estimation in this chapter.  
' ' ' '




In Equation (1) the dependent variable represents credit available to household i in village 
j at time t. We used two variables to indicate credit access, one was a dummy variable 
indicating whether household i in village j borrowed money at time t, and the other was 
natural logarithm of the amount that household i in village j borrowed money at time t 
(includes zero and non-zero amount)4.  
Rjt represents a dummy variable which is equal to one for households in villages that 
received road improvement after they have received the road improvement. Therefore, the 
coefficient of this variable gives the estimate of the impact of rural roads improvement on 
access to credit.  
iv represents household level fixed effects. jµ represents the unobserved fixed area 
characteristics needed to be controlled for (Binswanger et al., 1993; Khandker et al., 2006). 
These household level fixed effects control for time invariant unobserved effects that may 
be correlated with the variable jtR  and affect households' credit access. t  represent dummy 
variables representing years. 
As it was specified in the equation earlier that access to credit is likely to be affected 
by household characteristics we control for household characteristics that change over 
time. Hijt represents a vector of such controls that includes the following variables:  
A dummy variable indicating if any household member is member of any type of 
non-governmental organization (NGO). This variable indicates poverty status as NGOs 
choose poorest of the poor and provide access to credit.  
Education of household head in household i in village j at time t. Higher level of 
education of household head enhances earnings and hence access to credit.  
A dummy variable indicating whether a household is agricultural or not. 
Agricultural households may have access to loans from agricultural banks. As households 
in rural areas tend to have household members involved in both agricultural and non-
agricultural activity, we defined a household as agricultural if it owned agricultural land. 
                                                           
4 A transformation was done by adding 1 to all the observations of the variable so that natural logarithm 
of the variable could be taken) 
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Households with agricultural land are likely to be self-employed in agricultural activity 
and hence can be thought to be representative of the agricultural sector.  
Household head’s age as younger household heads may have different income 
levels, different networks and thus different access to credit than older household heads.  
Household size can affect access to credit as more members can request for loans.  
Proportion of household in age range 0-5, 6-13, 14-35, 36-59, and 60 years and 
over in household i in village j at time t: High proportion of members in the age range 14-
35, and 36-59 can increase the number of people who can possibly work and have access 
to credit.  
In Equation (1) ijth  represents a vector of two variables, a dummy variable indicating 
whether a household is agricultural or not and another dummy variable indicating whether 
household has at least one ngo member. To examine whether the elasticity of credit with 
respect to roads is different for agricultural and non-agricultural households, we interacted 
the dummy variable Rjt representing road improvement with a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a household is agricultural or not. The elasticity of credit with respect to 
road for non-agricultural households is given by Rjt and elasticity of credit with respect to 
roads for agricultural households is given by the sum of the coefficient of Rjt and the 
coefficient of this interaction term.  
There may be time varying unobservable factors that affect access to credit. We use 
pre-project village level characteristics interacted with time to take time varying 
unobservable characteristics into account. In Equation (1), the vector 0jA represents 
observable pre-program village level characteristics including pre-project population 
density, literacy rate, rainfall, number of commercial banks, agricultural banks, and micro-
finance institutions, number of hospitals, number of schools, and electricity availability in 
village j.  
 
ijtu  is the error term. 
 
Using the model described above and different years of data we estimated three types of 
effects, referred to as overall effect, short-term effect, and long-term effect.  
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We estimated the short term effect of transportation cost reduction using two different 
samples of data, one sample consisting of data from 1997 and 2000 for those households 
that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000 and the control households for 
those years, and another sample consisting of data from 2000 and 2005 for those 
households that received road improvement between 2000 and 2005 and the control 
households. We estimated the long-term effect by using data from 1997 and 2005 for those 
households that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000. We estimated the 
overall effect, i.e. the effect of ever receiving a treatment using data for households from 
1997, 2000, and 2005. 
To examine the sensitivity of the results, we used another definition of agricultural 
household based on whether household members were self-employed in agricultural sector 
or not and if they were wage employees in the agricultural sector whether majority of the 
total household labor was supplied to agricultural production. 
Access to credit is likely to change as improved roads provide better access to financial 
institution as well as to relative and friends of household members who can lend. Access 
to credit might also improve as a result of road improvement if land value, and hence 
collateral value, improves in areas that received road improvement post road improvement. 
Therefore, to validate the effect of road improvement on access to credit, we examined a 
mechanism by which road improvement affects access to credit. We empirically analyzed 
whether real per unit land price (adjusted for inflation) changed as a result of road 
improvement and how land value changed for households that can be classified as 
agricultural households. We estimated the following model represented by Equation (2) to 
examine the mechanism. 
' '
0 1 2 0* ( * )ijt jt ijt jt j j ijtLandvalue R h R A t t uτ τ τ ω µ= + + + + + +  
In Equation (2) the depedent variable represents the natural logarithm of real land price 
per unit of land (calculated using self-reported total value land owned by household 
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divided by total amount of land owned by household and then adjusted for inflation to 
obtain per unit price in 1997 Taka)5.  
jtR is the same as defined in Equation (1). jµ represents district level fixed effect that 
capture the unobserved fixed area characteristics that are likely to affect land price. These 
district level fixed effects control for time invariant unobserved effects that may be 
correlated with the variable jtR  and affect households' land price. t  represent dummy 
variables representing years.  
ijth  represents a dummy variable indicating whether a household is agricultural or not. To 
examine whether the elasticity of  land price with respect to roads is different for 
agricultural and non-agricultural households, we interacted the dummy variable Rjt with 
ijth . The elasticity of land price with respect to road for non-agricultural households is given 
by Rjt and elasticity of credit with respect to roads for agricultural households is given by 
the sum of the coefficient of Rjt and the coefficient of this interaction term ( *ijt jth R ).  
There may be time varying unobservable factors that affect land price. We used 
pre-project village level characteristics interacted with time to take time varying 
unobservable characteristics into account. In Equation (2), the vector 0jA represents 
observable pre-program village level characteristics including pre-project population 
density, literacy rate, rainfall, number of commercial banks, agricultural banks, micro-
finance institutions, number of hospitals, number of schools, and electricity availability in 
village. ijtu  is the error term.  
 
2.4 Data  
For the empirical analysis we used panel data collected by Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies. The data came from household and community surveys conducted 
prior to and following the implementation of Rural Roads and Markets Improvement and 
                                                           
5 1 US=25.63 Taka in 1997. 
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Maintenance Project (RRMIMP). RRMIMP included improvement of 574 km of feeder 
roads to bitumen-surfaced standard, construction of 1900 m of culverts, 1750 m of bridges, 
and 2200 m of small drainage structures on rural roads. In total, 10 roads across various 
districts were selected for the project. Two control roads were selected from two separate 
districts in the same region. The surveys cover 1284 households across 28 villages over the 
three rounds. The first phase of the RRMIMP survey collected pre-project benchmark 
information on project and control households during May-September 1997. The second 
phase covered the same households between 2000 and February 2001 after the project had 
been introduced between 1997 and 2000. The third phase was completed in March-July 
2005. Out of this sample of 28 villages, 10 served as control, while remaining 18 received 
the project at different times (either between 1997 and 2001 or between 2001 and 2005). 
About 65 percent of the households sampled (833 out of 1284 households) received the 
project sometime between 1997 and 2005 (referred to as project 2 households), 62 percent 
of this group received project between 1997 and 2001 (referred to as Project 1 households), 
while the remaining 38 percent received the project between 2001 and 2005. These data 
are especially suitable for the analysis in this study because of the long horizon that this 
data covers, which allows us to examine a mechanism through which road improvement 
affects agricultural output in both the short as well as long run.    
2.5 Summary Statistics: 
 
This section discusses the summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis 
later as dependent variables and control variables. As road development projects are not 
placed randomly in developing countries, it is important to identify how the project areas 
were chosen in order to identify the effect of the project on access to credit. People in 
charge of collecting data and knowledgeable about the road improvement projects reported 
that the road project areas were chosen to be placed in areas where the level of economic 
activity and overall infrastructure was low so as to give these areas an economic boost. In 
order to check how the control areas compared to the areas that received road improvement 
between 1997 and 2000 and those that received road improvement between 2000 and 2005, 
summary statistics of area characteristics that are indicative of the level of development of 
these areas pre-road improvement are presented in Table 1. Table 1 shows population 
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density of these areas according to the 1991 census and the 2001 census, literacy rate among 
population aged 11-45 years, number of commercial, agricultural and microfinance banks, 
number of schools and hospitals, and the percent of villages that have electricity in these 
areas. Population density is lower in the project areas than in the control areas according to 
both the 1991 and 2001 census indicating that it is possible that pre-treatment the project 
areas are more rural and isolated. Similar pattern can be observed from the literacy rate, 
which shows that although the literacy rates are close in these control and project areas 
(approximately 39 percent in control areas, 34 percent in project 2 areas, and 30 percent in 
project 1 areas), the project areas were slightly farther behind in terms of literacy rates. 
There are fewer commercial and microfinance banks in the districts where the road 
improvement projects took place but more agricultural banks suggesting that the projects 
areas may be slightly more agriculturally involved. Interestingly there are more schools in 
the project areas than the control areas, and the number of hospitals are higher in project 2 
areas than in the control and project 1 areas, which both have about the same no. of 
hospitals on average. It also seems that the percent of villages that have electricity in control 
areas are slightly lower than the project 1 and 2 areas. Overall, the pre-program 
characteristics indicate that according to some characteristics the project areas were lagging 
behind in development while in some other characteristics the control areas were lagging 
behind in 1997.  
Road improvement is expected to reduce transportation cost in rural areas in Bangladesh 
in all seasons, but more so in rainy seasons where rainfall is considerable. Table 2 shows 
the level of average monthly rainfall (in centimeters) in the districts where control and 
project villages are located and compare how the road project improvement affected the 
transportation cost of major agricultural produces and inputs in rainy season and dry 
season. The amount of average monthly rainfall in these areas were very similar (3-5% 
difference in rainfall between the project and control areas in each year of survey) and it 
varied by year and the rainfall was lower in 2005 in all these areas than in the years 1997 
and 2000. Summary statistics of cost of transporting a maund (40 kg) of a crop/input to 
market shows that the transportation cost is more commonly lower in the dry season than 
in the rainy season. Rural road improvement conducted in project 1 areas and in project 2 




Table 3 shows the household characteristics in 1997, 2000, and 2005 in project and control 
areas. The characteristics presented include percent of households that are primarily 
involved in the agricultural sector, percent of households that have electricity, and good 
quality latrine. They also include percent of households that have muslim head, and a male 
head, currently married head, average age of household head, highest education level in 
household, percent of households that have at least one ngo member in that household. In 
all three rounds of survey, project 1 and control households have very similar percentage 
of households that are primarily involved in the agricultural sector, while project 2 has 
significantly lower percentage of households that are primarily involved in the agricultural 
sector than in project 1 and control areas in all three rounds of survey.  Households were 
defined as agricultural based on two measures: (1) If households own agricultural land (2) 
If household members were self-employed in the agricultural sector or if most of the labor 
supplied for wage employment was in the agricultural sector.. The percent of households 
that are primarily agriculturally involved are very similar according to both the land 
ownership based definition and the labor supply based definition of agricultural 
households.  
 
A very small percent of households report having electricity pre-road improvement in all 
three areas, control, project 1, and project 2. In all of these areas, the percent of households 
that has electricity increased over time, however, the percent of households with electricity 
has increased the most in project 2 and control areas between the 1997 and 2005. The 
percent of households with good quality latrines were similar in the three areas in 1997 and 
it increased about 32-41 percent by 2005 however the percentage increase was the highest 
for the project 2 areas. The percent of muslim households in control areas is the lowest 
(about 72 percent) relative to (over 90 percent) in project 1 and project 2 areas, and the 
proportion of muslim households remained constant over time in control, project 1, and 
project 2 areas. The percent of male headed households has remained fairly constant 
(around 90 percent) over time in all these areas. The average age of household heads in 
control and project areas is very similar (slightly over 40 years) and the average age of 
household head has also remained more or less constant over time in these areas. Nearly 
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all household heads are married in all three areas in all the survey years. The highest level 
of education of household members in these areas are very similar in all these areas in all 
the survey years. The percent of households with at least one ngo member in household is 
very similar across these areas in all the survey years, however, ngo membership has 
increased between 1997 and 2005 from about 33-37 percent to 41-43 percent.  
 
Table 4 shows the household size in project and control areas and household demographic 
composition in project and control areas in 1997, 2000 and 2005. It indicates that the 
household size and composition are similar across project and control areas in all three 
rounds of survey.   
 
Table 5 shows the amount of total land that households own, and the total value of land in 
project and control areas in 1997, 2000 and 2005. It shows total household income (total 
income from agricultural, non-agricultural wage employment, salaried employment in non-
agricultural sector, self-employment in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, in 
addition, total income from animal stock sales and agricultural crop sales, rental property, 
and remittances) in 1997 and 2000 as income data is available in the data for only these 
two rounds of survey. Amount of total land owned in control areas is the greatest followed 
by project 1 areas and then project 2 areas in all the survey years and total land ownership 
has also declined over time in all these areas. Total value of land owned increased 
consistently in control and project 2 areas but in project 1 areas the total value of land 
increased between 1997 and 2000 quite significantly but decreased slightly between 2000 
and 2005. Average real income decreased in control and project 2 areas (the areas that did 
not receive road improvement) between 1997 and 2000 but average real income increased 
between 1997 and 2000 for households in project 1 areas (areas that received road 
improvement between 1997 and 2000).        
 
Table 6 shows the percent of households that borrowed money and the amount that they 
borrowed in the year previous to the corresponding survey years 1997, 2000, and 2005. 
The percent of households that borrowed money in 1996 and 1999 were the same for 
control areas although it increased about 3 percent between 2000 and 2005. Between 1997 
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and 2000 the percent of households that borrowed money increased in project 1 areas and 
between 2000 and 2005 the percent of households that borrowed money increased in 
project 2 areas, indicating an increase in the percent of households that borrow money in 
the short run after road improvement, however between 1999 and 2004, the percent of 
households that borrowed money in project 1 areas declined. Among those that borrowed 
money the average amount borrowed in the past year decreased in project 1 areas between 
1997 and 2000 and increased between 2000 and 2005. Among the borrowers, the average 
amount borrowed in control areas decreased slightly between 1996 and 1999 and increased 
slightly between 1999 and 2004. However, in project 2 areas the amount borrowed 
decreased between 1996 and 1999 however it increased between 1999 and 2004 in these 
areas. Summary statistics indicate that there were differences in village and district level 
characteristics that most likely affected the Local Government Engineering Department’s 
decision regarding whether to improve roads or not and these characteristics are likely to 
be correlated with time varying factors that affect access to credit. So for this reason we 
include the interaction of these characteristics with time dummy in the regressions as 
control variables. Household characteristics likely to affect demand and access to loans so 
we control the variables mentioned in this section.  
 
2.5 Regression Results  
Effect of transport cost reduction on access to credit 
Using the variables summarized in the earlier section and empirical specification discussed 
earlier, this study analyzed whether transportation cost reduction changes access to credit 
in general and whether the change differs for agricultural and non-agricultural households.  
 
 
Analysis of overall effect  
Table 7 shows that households that ever received road improvement has on average 22 
percent higher probability of borrowing. The effect does not differ for agricultural and non-
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agricultural households. It shows that receiving road improvement increases the amount 
borrowed by 162 percent. Regression analysis indicates that households where at least one 
person is member of ngo have significantly higher probability of borrowing and also the 
amount that they borrow. This result is intuitive given that the one of the major roles of 
ngos in rural areas is to provide micro-loans. However, the results do not indicate the effect 
of ngo membership was different in areas that received road improvement.  
More educated households seems to have higher access to credit as the maximum years of 
schooling has a statistically significant positive effect on both the probability of borrowing 
and the amount borrowed. As education is an proxy for human capital and human capital 
significantly affects the amount borrowed, it suggests that lenders are more likely to lend 
to more educated individuals in the absence of complete information about borrower’s 
propensity to default. This is suggestive evidence that markets are credit markets are indeed 
incomplete. Bigger households borrow more. The pre-project initial area characteristics 
interacted with round indicates that areas with greater population density, more agricultural 
banks, micro-finance institutions, hospitals are more likely to borrow more over time. The 
pre-project initial areas characteristics such as literacy rates, rainfall, no. of commercial 
banks, and no. of schools interacted with the variable indicating round shows that areas 
with higher literacy rates, more commercial banks and school borrowed less over time. 
Overall the households borrowed more in 2000 and 2005 round relative to 1997 as 
indicated by the positive coefficient of the dummy variables indicating years.  
Short-run effects:  
Analysis of short-run effects in areas that received road improvement between 1997 
and 2000. 
Table 8 shows that households that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000 
has on average 33.5 percent higher probability of borrowing. It shows that in the short-run, 
agricultural households were less likely to borrow after road improvement, although the 
amount borrowed was not significantly different for agricultural households post road 
improvement. In other words, the effect of road improvement does not differ for 
agricultural and non-agricultural households. It shows that receiving road improvement 
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increases the amount borrowed by about 234 percent. In this sample of households and 
over this time period we find that households where at least one person is member of ngo 
have significantly higher probability of borrowing, and also borrow more in amount. 
However, the effect of ngo membership on access to credit was not different in areas that 
received road improvement from those that did not.  
Households borrowed more on average in 2000 relative to 1997.  The sign of the 
coefficients of other variables are similar in nature as shown in Table 7. 
 Analysis of short-run effects in areas that received road improvement between 2000 
and 2005. 
Table 9a shows that households in areas that received road improvement between 2000 and 
2005 has on average 20.5 percent higher probability of borrowing. It shows that households 
in these areas that did not change the amount borrowed and that the effect of road 
improvement on access to credit is the same in agricultural and non-agricultural 
households. In this sample of households and over this time period also we find that 
households where at least one person is member of ngo have significantly higher 
probability of borrowing and borrow more in amount, although, the effect of ngo 
membership was not different in areas that received road improvement. In these areas 
households borrowed less on average in 2005 relative to 2000.  
 
The results shown in Table 9b indicates that the effects are similar in nature when we 
include predetermined total income in the regression. It needs to be noted that the 
coefficient of total income is not statistically significant. The regression includes several 
variables (such as the dummy indicating whether household owns agricultural land, 
education, household size and household demographic characteristics, and district and 
village area characteristics) that are likely to be correlated with total income, which can 




Analysis of Long-run effects in areas that received road improvement between 1997 
and 2000: 
This study used data for 1997 and 2005 for households that received road improvement 
between 1997 and 2000 and the control households to examine the long-run effect of road 
improvement on access to credit. Table 10 shows that households that received road 
improvement between 1997 and 2000 has on average 39 percent higher probability of 
borrowing in the long-run. The effect of road improvement on access to credit does not 
differ for agricultural and non-agricultural households. It shows that receiving road 
improvement increases the amount borrowed by 282 percent. The comparison of short-run 
effect (effect of road improvement observed between 1997 and 2000) and long-run effect 
(the effect observed between 1997 and 2005)) indicate that the effect of road improvement 




Sensitivity analysis:  
Analysis of overall effect 
In the analysis discussed earlier, we defined agricultural households based on whether 
they own agricultural land. So, to test the sensitivity of the effect of road improvement on 
access to credit for agricultural households, we used labor supply based definition of 
agricultural households. According to the agricultural land ownership based definition 
59% of households are agricultural and therefore 41% non-agricultural, and according to 
the labor supply based definition 58% of households are agricultural and therefore 42% 
non-agricultural. This indicates that both the definitions indicate that the same proportion 
of households are involved in agriculture. However, there are 16 percent of households 
that are agricultural households under the land ownership based definition that are not 
agricultural households under the labor supply based definition. There are about 15 
percent of households that are agricultural households under the labor supply based 
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definition that are not agricultural households according to the land ownership based 
definition. Otherwise, there are 26 % of households in the survey where households are 
not agricultural according to both land ownership based and labor supply based 
definitions. There are 43% of households that are agricultural according to both land 
ownership and labor supply based definitions. 
 
Table 11 shows that households that ever received road improvement has on average 19 
percent higher probability of borrowing. The effect does not differ for agricultural and non-
agricultural households. It shows that receiving road improvement increases the amount 
borrowed by 145 percent. The effect of ever receiving treatment estimated using the two 
different definitions of agricultural households yield results of the same nature, i.e. positive 
significant effect of road improvement on access to credit but the effect is not different for 





Analysis of short-run effect in areas that received road improvement between 1997 
and 2000 
In the short-run, households that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000 has 
on average 30.5 percent higher probability of borrowing (as shown in Table 12). It shows 
that receiving road improvement increases the amount borrowed by about 226 percent. 
When we use the definition of agricultural household based on labor supply we find that in 
the short-run agricultural households were less likely to borrow, and borrowed less money 
post road improvement.  This result is slightly different from what was found when 
agricultural household definition based on landownership was used. The sign of the 
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coefficients of other variables are similar in nature as found when we defined the 
agricultural households based on land ownership. 
  
Analysis of short-run effects in areas that received road improvement between 2000 
and 2005 
Table 13 shows that households in areas that received road improvement between 2000 
and 2005 has on average 22.7 percent higher probability of borrowing. Unlike in the case 
when we defined agricultural households based on land ownership, in this case, we find 
that road improvement increased the amount borrowed. Similar to the previous results, 
analysis shows that the effect of road improvement is the same in agricultural and non-
agricultural households. This analysis shows that households borrowed on average the 
same in 2005 and 2000.   
 
Analysis of Long-run effects in areas that received road improvement between 1997 
and 2000: 
 
Table 14 shows that households that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000 
has on average 31 percent higher probability of borrowing in the long-run. The effect does 
not differ for agricultural and non-agricultural households. It shows that receiving road 
improvement increases the amount borrowed by 218 percent. The comparison of short-run 
effect (effect of road improvement observed between 1997 and 2000) and long-run effect 
(the effect observed between 1997 and 2005)) indicate that the effect of road improvement 
sustains over time. The comparison of results where we define agricultural households 
based on land ownership and labor supply indicate that agricultural households and non-
agricultural households on average borrow the same amount although this result is sensitive 
to the definition of agricultural households in areas that received road improvement 
between 1997 and 2000 in the short-run. These results indicate that agricultural and non-
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agricultural households on average have either the same access to loans or agricultural 
households have lower probability of borrowing or borrow less.  
Sensitivity of results to exclusion of certain control variables:  
Some may argue that villagers become members of NGO in order to borrow money and so 
borrowing and NGO membership decisions are jointly made. In addition, some may argue 
that as roads improve NGO membership may increase, i.e. NGO membership is 
endogenous. So we examined whether NGO membership changed as a result of road 
improvement and found that road improvement did not have a significant effect on road 
improvement. 6  In addition, we examined the effect of not including the dummy variable 
indicating NGO membership and not including the interaction term between NGO 
membership dummy and the dummy variable indicating whether the household received 
road improvement or not. The results related to this analysis are presented in the section 
titled Empirical Appendix for Chapter 2. The results presented in Tables A-D in the section 
titled Empirical Appendix indicates that as roads improve households borrow more and 
that there is weak evidence suggesting that non-agricultural households borrow more post 
road improvement. The analysis indicates that the results are robust to exclusion of 
variables that may be considered endogeneous by some.  
 
Mechanism: 
In an effort to examine what influenced the increase in borrowing post road improvement 
among those that received road improvement and what may have caused relatively more 
borrowing among the non-agricultural households, we examined a few mechanisms. The 
results related to that analysis are discussed in this section. We discuss here the findings 
related to the effect of road improvement on land prices (collateral value) and interest rates 
(price of borrowing), i.e. the factors that are likely candidates to affect borrowing. 
                                                           
6 In the interest of space this result has not been presented in this dissertation but the 
results are available upon request. 
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 Regression results indicate that real per unit land price increased more over time in areas 
that received road improvement than those that did not. Moreover, it indicates that non-
agricultural household’s land value increased more than agricultural household’s price post 
road improvement. To analyze why this might be the case, we further analyzed how per 
unit price of different types of land changed as a result of road improvement. Analysis 
indicates that homestead land and commercial land value increased more than agricultural 
land value as a result of road improvement. As agricultural households own more 
agricultural land than land used for non-agricultural purposes, the land value increased less 
for them than non-agricultural households.  Detailed analysis result has been left out in the 
interest of space but are available upon request. This is an indication of the fact that non-
agricultural land such as commercial land and homestead value increased more than 
agricultural land price.   
We didn’t find a statistically significant effect of road improvement on interest rate as can 
be seen in Table E presented in Empirical Appendix for Chapter 2. However, we find that 
post road improvement, in areas that received road improvement non-agricultural 
households paid lower interest rates, possibly suggesting that higher collateral value 
allowed them to borrow at lower interest rates. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Transportation cost reduction by improving access to markets, health facilities, 
schools and other government and administrative services can enhance income 
opportunities and improve overall quality of lives. Numerous studies have found 
significant positive effects of access to markets on both agricultural and non-agricultural 
returns in developing countries. To the best of our knowledge, most of these papers either 
do not explicitly explain whether they assume that markets function perfectly or assume 
that markets function perfectly. This paper theoretically analyzes the effect of road 
improvement on the agricultural sector both under the assumption of perfect and imperfect 
markets. It uses a rural market equilibrium framework with the assumption that capital and 
labor stock remains constant in the short run, i.e., does not change with road improvement, 
which allows the input choices in one sector to affect the output in the other. Using this 
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theoretical framework it first analyzes the effect of a road improvement on agricultural 
productivity under the assumption of imperfect markets and finds that if the elasticity of 
access to credit (as road quality changes) in the agricultural sector is lower than that in the 
non-agricultural sector then the agricultural productivity will decrease as a result of road 
improvement. Otherwise, rural road improvement can be expected to lead to improvement 
in agricultural productivity in the short run. Then using this theoretical framework and the 
assumption of perfect markets it finds that agricultural return remains the same after road 
improvement in the short run. In the long run, the effect is ambiguous under perfect markets 
when both labor and capital stock improves with road improvement. In the long run, when 
capital stock increases but labor stock decreases in rural market, agricultural output will 
decrease in case of specialization in local crops, but in case of specialization in HYV crops 
the effect on agricultural outpur is ambiguous. In the long run, agricultural output will 
increase when both traditional and high yield variety crops are grown. Under imperfect 
markets, the effect of road improvement on the agricultural sector is ambiguous in the long 
run.  
Using panel data for the years 1997, 2000, and 2005 from rural Bangladesh where markets 
may not function well, this chapter evaluates how Rural Roads and Markets Improvement 
and Maintenance Project (RRMIMP) affected access to credit and examined whether the 
elasticity of access to credit with respect to road quality is different for agricultural and 
non-agricultural households. Empirical analysis provides suggestive evidence that credit 
markets are indeed incomplete, as lenders lend more to households with higher human 
capital (a proxy for collateral). Empirical analysis further indicates that road improvement 
increased access to credit significantly but there is weak evidence that the elasticity of 
access to credit is lower for the agricultural sector. This indicates that the effect of road 
improvement on agricultural sector may not be unambiguously positive in the short-run. In 
the long-run, the effect is the found to be the same across agricultural and non-agricultural 
households. This indicates that in the presence of imperfect markets when only traditional 
crops are grown or only HYV crops are grown and both capital and labor stock increases 
in rural market agricultural output will increase but when capital stock increases but labor 




Sensitivity analysis conducted using different methods of classifying agricultural 
households indicate that the findings are robust. Analysis of the effect of road improvement 
on land price indicates that land price increase may have contributed to the increase in 
collateral value and fostered the increase access to credit post rural road infrastructure 
development. Land price increased more for the non-agricultural sector and the non-
agricultural sector paid relatively lower interest rates, plausibly as a result of greater 
increase in value of land used for non-agricultural purposes post transport cost reduction. 
Change in access to credit may be slower than change in self-reported land value because 
of the absence of a well-functioning land market, however, over time if change is access to 
credit catches up to the change in land price, we may expect the non-agricultural sector to 
have strictly more access to credit as road quality improves. This might indicate that with 
transport infrastructure development and urbanization of rural areas the agricultural sector 
productivity might decrease as the non-agricultural sector proliferates.  
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Table 1: Area characteristics: indicator of development prior to road improvement 
Pre-program characteristics: Control  Project 2  Project 1 
 
   
Population density 1991 census 2221 1572 895 
 
1626 1228 226 
 
   
population density 2001 census 3094 2044.21 1060 
 
2502 1907.38 258 
 
   
No. of commercial banks in the 
district 19 18 8 
 
10 7 4 
 
   
No. of agricultural banks in the 
district 0.00 0.58 1.00 
 
0.00 0.49 0.92 
 
   
No. of mfi banks in the district 3.71 1.37 1.91 
 
2.50 1.35 1.84 
 
   
No. of hospitals 1.63 2.57 1.58 




   
No. of schools 12.71 19.71 16.59 
 
2.50 7.57 4.44 
 
   
Village has electricity 0.26 0.81 0.56 
 
0.44 0.39 0.50 
 
   
Literacy rate (preprogram 2000) 39.35 34.24 30.37 
  13.48 10.48 4.59 






















Table 2: Transport costs Denominated in 1997 taka 
                                          Control  Project 1 Project 2 







Rainfall (cm) 166 179 121 159 151 170 117 
 
22 16 37 22 24.5 17 27 
Rice transportation cost (rainy 
season) 
6.84 7.04 6.24 5.89 4.78 4.25 3.21 
 
2.22 3.57 0.99 1.26 1.9 2.43 1.69 
 
       
Rice transportation cost (dry 
season) 
5.56 6.07 5.78 6.94 4.61 3.61 2.8 
 
1.74 3.98 1.47 3.7 2.29 1.84 1.62 
 
       
Jute transportation cost (rainy 
season) 
6.65 7.55 6.46 6.82 5.55 4.96 3.74 
 
1.95 3.92 0.471 1.59 1.9 2.8 2.18 
 
       
Jute transportation cost (dry 
season) 
5.43 7.15 5.28 8.23 6.21 4.11 3.52 
 
1.51 4.28 1.56 3.44 2.78 1.91 2.17 
 
       
Sugar transportation cost (rainy 
season) 
 6.49 4.62  4.95 4.26 1.32 




       
Sugar transportation cost (dry 
season) 
6.41 3.64 3.3  5.88 4 1.32 
 
1.28 0.4 0 
 
3.25 1.67 0 
 
       
Potato transportation cost (rainy 
season) 




1.97 1.97 2.93 0.739 
 
       
Potato transportation cost (dry 
season) 




6.7 3.31 2.07 0.854 
 
       
        
Other crops transportation cost 
(rainy season) 
6.27 9.06 6.38  5.39 3.63 3.49 
 
1.44 3.58 1.42 
 
1.82 2.48 1.39 
 
       
Other crops transportation 
cost(dry season) 
5.41 8.56 5.28  5.45 3.44 3.036 
 
1.74 4.12 1.64 
 
2.47 2.01 1.43 
 
       
Fertilizer transportation cost 
(rainy season) 




1.35 3.46 1.34 1.73 1.9 2.6 1.63 
 
       
        
Fertilizer transportation cost 
(dry season) 
5.14 6.33 5.89 8.58 5.11 3.93 3.18 
 
1.07 3.99 1.29 3.95 2.59 2.3 1.64 
 
       
        
Seeds transportation cost (rainy 
season) 
5.94 7.53 6.27 6.6 5.02 3.1 2.31 
 
1.26 3.46 0.81 2.3 1.77 1.92 0.72 
 
       
Seeds transportation cost (dry 
season) 
4.8 6.37 4.95 8.28 4.98 2.88 2.24 
  0.41 4.02 2.74 4.95 2.85 1.62 0.867 
Note: for each variable, the top row shows the mean and the bottom row shows standard deviations 
Transportation cost was measured in 1997 Taka. 1 US dollar=25.63 Taka in 1997 
71 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of household characteristics 
 
  1997 2000 2005 














Percent of households agricultural 
involved (labor supply based) 
0.79 0.51 0.74 0.67 0.41 0.6 0.57 0.41 0.58 
 
0.41 0.5 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.49 0.49 
 
         
Percent of households agriculturally 
involved (land ownership based) 
0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.6 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
 
        
Percent of hh with electricity 0 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.27 0.18 0.45 0.62 0.28 
 
0 0.35 0.36 0.25 0.44 0.38 0.5 0.49 0.45 
 
         
Percent of hh with good quality latrine 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.46 0.34 0.51 0.65 0.54 
 
0.39 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.48 0.5 
 
         
Percent of hh that have muslim hh head 0.72 0.99 0.94 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.71 0.98 0.94 
 
0.45 0.11 0.25 0.45 0.12 0.24 0.45 0.13 0.24 
 
         
Percent of hh with male as head 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.94 
 
0.24 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.24 
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Age of hh head 43 44 41 42 44 43 45 45 44 
 
13 14 13 14 14 13 15 14 13 
 
         
Percent of households where hh head is 
currently married 
0.89 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.9 0.92 
 
0.31 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.3 0.26 
 
         
Highest education level in hh 5.08 5.1 5.33 5.55 5.83 5.85 6.01 6.1 6.3 
 
4.04 3.92 4.09 3.71 3.73 4 3.79 3.6 3.8 
 
         
Percent of hh that have at least one ngo 
member 
0.37 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.43 
  0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.5 0.49 0.5 
          




Table 4: Household Size demographic composition in project and control areas in 1997, 2000, and 2005 
  1997 2000 2005 













HH. Size 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.6 4.0 4.5 4.6 
 
2.4 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.9 2.0 
 
         
No. of members aged 0-6 yrs 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 
 
0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
 
         
No. of members aged 7-13 yrs 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 
 
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
         
No. of members aged 14-35 yrs 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.6 
 
1.4 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.7 
 
         
No. of members aged 35-59 yrs 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 
 
         
No. of members aged 60 and over 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 
Note: for each variable, the top row shows the mean and the bottom row shows standard deviations
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Table 5: Amount, and value of land owned and total household income  
  1997 2000 2005 














total land 161 89 131 140 79 123 101 56 91 
 
261 184 193 237 153 209 181 109 159 
 
         




1997 Taka) 195277 193717 218611 271916 240696 386650 291849 267345 368893 
  360593 417635 333958 455965 424759 686278 545577 556489 633460 
          




Taka) 18580 29174 22505 15519 28282 29443    
 23202 40196 70290 20176 30761 63700    
          
          
  Note: hh denotes household. For each variable, the top row shows the mean and the bottom 
row shows standard deviations 
 











Table 6: Borrowing pattern in project and Control households pre and post road 
improvement 
  1997 2000 2005 


















last year 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.37 0.55 0.58 0.42 0.42 
 
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 
 









(real) 3530 4622 3672 2374 2640 3950 3451 3551 3285 
 
8241 15221 8258 4652 6875 9713 6541 9380 13017 
 




        





(real) 6429 9589 7718 4324 7062 7164 5946 8505 7867 
  10264 20829 10593 5573 9770 12173 7682 13000 19244 








Table 7: Effect of road improvement on access to credit  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: Ever received treatment 1.626*** 0.220*** 
  (4.957) (5.611) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) 0.0414 0.0185 
  (0.152) (0.568) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*dummy=1 if hh 
is agricultural -0.193 -0.0354 
  (-0.682) (-1.045) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 3.890*** 0.449*** 
  (17.69) (17.08) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*Dummy: at least 
one ngo member in household -0.112 -0.0192 
  (-0.404) (-0.580) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.489 0.0776* 
  (1.411) (1.877) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.316* 0.0391* 
  (1.788) (1.852) 
Household size 0.112** 0.00801 
  (2.296) (1.372) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.194** 0.0279** 
  (2.031) (2.440) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.0763 -0.00583 
  (-0.818) (-0.523) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0123 -0.000374 
  (0.142) (-0.0361) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.0326 -0.000553 
  (0.238) (-0.0339) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over -0.0349 -0.00851 
  (-0.187) (-0.382) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00820*** 0.00104*** 
  (10.70) (11.40) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round -0.307*** -0.0461*** 
  (-4.488) (-5.647) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.134*** -0.0153*** 
  (-10.28) (-9.822) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round -0.444*** -0.0515*** 
77 
 
  (-9.649) (-9.382) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round 2.364*** 0.331*** 
  (6.614) (7.748) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 0.135** 0.0245*** 
  (2.038) (3.096) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 1.074*** 0.148*** 
  (8.428) (9.712) 
No of school in village interacted with round -0.207*** -0.0299*** 
  (-6.418) (-7.775) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -0.432*** -0.0671*** 
  (-2.624) (-3.416) 
Round = 2 25.31*** 3.128*** 
  (12.39) (12.82) 
Round = 3 50.66*** 6.236*** 
  (12.41) (12.79) 
Constant 26.10*** 3.180*** 




Observations 3,987 3,987 
R-squared 0.239 0.232 
Number of households 1,504 1,504 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table 8: Short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 1997 and 2000) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt credit dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000 2.344*** 0.335*** 
  (3.515) (4.198) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) 0.0665 0.0250 
  (0.164) (0.513) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural -0.696 -0.109* 
  (-1.473) (-1.933) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 4.053*** 0.474*** 
  (13.39) (13.09) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*Dummy: at least one ngo member in 
household -0.340 -0.0689 
  (-0.754) (-1.276) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.468 0.0854 
  (0.783) (1.195) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.466* 0.0486 
  (1.677) (1.459) 
Household size 0.0249 -0.00288 
  (0.275) (-0.266) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.321* 0.0473** 
  (1.789) (2.202) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs 0.301* 0.0429** 
  (1.773) (2.111) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.183 0.0182 
  (1.270) (1.056) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs -0.0928 -0.0196 
  (-0.384) (-0.677) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over -0.159 -0.0274 
  (-0.480) (-0.693) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00391*** 0.000499*** 
  (2.669) (2.842) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round -0.346** -0.0566*** 
  (-2.170) (-2.964) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.0485 -0.00300 
  (-1.480) (-0.765) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round -0.0209 0.00653 
  (-0.172) (0.449) 
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No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round 1.002 0.159* 
  (1.357) (1.795) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 0.0710 0.0192 
  (0.473) (1.070) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 0.0420 0.0121 
  (0.163) (0.393) 
No of school in village interacted with round -0.143** -0.0222*** 
  (-2.210) (-2.869) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -1.136*** -0.169*** 
  (-3.390) (-4.205) 
Round = 2 15.43*** 1.788*** 
  (3.469) (3.357) 





Observations 2,613 2,613 
R-squared 0.230 0.235 
Number of households 1,421 1,421 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table 9a: Short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 2000 and 2005) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005 1.442 0.205* 
  (1.562) (1.877) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) -0.514 -0.0696 
  (-1.150) (-1.317) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural 0.781 0.0784 
  (1.595) (1.355) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 2.906*** 0.346*** 
  (7.599) (7.651) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005*Dummy: at least one ngo member in 
household 0.646 0.0755 
  (1.268) (1.256) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.571 0.0747 
  (0.968) (1.072) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.197 0.0323 
  (0.529) (0.735) 
Household size 0.108 0.0107 
  (1.217) (1.020) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.0964 0.0165 
  (0.537) (0.779) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.195 -0.0238 
  (-1.007) (-1.044) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0217 -0.00280 
  (0.129) (-0.141) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.244 0.0125 
  (0.883) (0.382) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.199 0.0216 
  (0.553) (0.509) 
Pre-project population density interacted with 
round -0.00324 -0.000683 
  (-0.323) (-0.590) 






Pre-project rainfall interacted with round 0.0490 -0.0164 
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  (0.224) (-0.887) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 





No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round -1.819 -0.0783 
  (-1.038) (-0.669) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 0.980 0.105* 
  (0.966) (1.953) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round 0.308 0.0369 
  (0.568) (0.576) 
round = 3 -13.84 -0.851 
  (-0.335) (-0.490) 
Constant -25.93 -1.410 




Observations 1,316 1,316 
R-squared 0.226 0.221 
Number of households 717 717 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 




Table 9b: Short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 2000 and 2005) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 2005 1.903* 0.243** 
  (1.933) (2.075) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-cultural land 
ownership) -0.563 -0.0751 
  (-1.172) (-1.313) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 2005*dummy=1 
if hh is agricultural 0.704 0.0713 
  (1.327) (1.131) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 2.770*** 0.329*** 
  (6.671) (6.663) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 2005*Dummy: 
at least one ngo member in household 0.634 0.0707 
  (1.135) (1.064) 
log of lagged total household income (taka) 0.0985 0.0145 
  (0.679) (0.842) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.640 0.0648 
  (0.908) (0.773) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in household 0.310 0.0436 
  (0.763) (0.902) 
Household size 0.117 0.0141 
  (1.056) (1.071) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.130 0.0210 
  (0.616) (0.839) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.151 -0.0198 
  (-0.681) (-0.752) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0915 0.00602 
  (0.457) (0.253) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.149 0.00207 
  (0.499) (0.0582) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.122 0.0115 
  (0.319) (0.252) 
Pre-project population density interacted with round -0.0152 -0.00190 
  (-1.362) (-1.464) 






Pre-project rainfall interacted with round 0.303 -0.0370* 
  (1.247) (-1.781) 








No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with round -3.572* 0.0578 
  (-1.852) (0.436) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in district  interacted with round 2.221** 0.160*** 
  (1.979) (2.705) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round 0.164 0.0204 
  (0.285) (0.299) 
round = 3 -62.42 -2.549 
  (-1.359) (-1.315) 
Constant -124.0 -4.904 




Observations 1,231 1,231 
R-squared 0.232 0.222 
Number of households 713 713 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 10: Long-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 1997 and 2000) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000 2.821** 0.392*** 
  (2.274) (2.680) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) -0.0809 0.00265 
  (-0.175) (0.0487) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural -0.623 -0.0709 
  (-1.256) (-1.212) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 3.917*** 0.433*** 
  (10.73) (10.07) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*Dummy: at least one ngo member in 
household -0.973** -0.122** 
  (-2.031) (-2.164) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 1.536*** 0.194*** 
  (2.646) (2.840) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.316 0.0336 
  (1.052) (0.948) 
Household size 0.107 0.00721 
  (1.395) (0.798) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.102 0.0199 
  (0.698) (1.155) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.0575 -0.00148 
  (-0.426) (-0.0931) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0495 0.00586 
  (0.366) (0.368) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.171 0.0171 
  (0.808) (0.688) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.180 0.0284 
  (0.615) (0.825) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00683*** 0.000750** 
  (2.596) (2.419) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round 0.619** 0.0589* 
  (2.380) (1.920) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.279** -0.0277* 
  (-2.246) (-1.889) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round -1.100*** -0.112** 
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  (-2.636) (-2.284) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round -1.045** -0.0829 
  (-1.974) (-1.329) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round -0.232* -0.0125 
  (-1.653) (-0.759) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 1.502*** 0.189*** 
  (6.679) (7.131) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -2.017*** -0.253*** 
  (-7.039) (-7.484) 
Round = 3 54.16** 5.177* 
  (2.031) (1.648) 
Constant 24.13* 2.254 




Observations 1,738 1,738 
R-squared 0.292 0.297 
Number of households 975 975 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 11: Sensitivity analysis: Effect of road improvement on access to credit  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: Ever received treatment 1.453*** 0.191*** 
  (4.824) (5.307) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-cultural land 
ownership) -0.205 -0.0204 
  (-0.923) (-0.766) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural 0.0644 0.00682 
  (0.231) (0.205) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 3.864*** 0.445*** 
  (17.68) (17.05) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*Dummy: at least one ngo 
member in household -0.0636 -0.0117 
  (-0.232) (-0.359) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.503 0.0809** 
  (1.475) (1.983) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in household 0.318* 0.0400* 
  (1.802) (1.899) 
Household size 0.114** 0.00842 
  (2.348) (1.450) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.195** 0.0281** 
  (2.045) (2.462) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.0717 -0.00523 
  (-0.767) (-0.469) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0141 -0.000414 
  (0.163) (-0.0401) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.0363 -0.000169 
  (0.265) (-0.0103) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over -0.0365 -0.00907 
  (-0.196) (-0.408) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00818*** 0.00104*** 
  (10.67) (11.36) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round -0.313*** -0.0472*** 
  (-4.604) (-5.803) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.133*** -0.0150*** 
  (-10.29) (-9.760) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted with round -0.436*** -0.0502*** 
  (-9.632) (-9.289) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with round 2.383*** 0.333*** 
  (6.672) (7.816) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in district  interacted with round 0.136** 0.0247*** 
  (2.042) (3.114) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 1.070*** 0.147*** 
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  (8.406) (9.664) 
No of school in village interacted with round -0.208*** -0.0300*** 
  (-6.409) (-7.756) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -0.433*** -0.0671*** 
  (-2.623) (-3.399) 
Round = 2 25.14*** 3.100*** 
  (12.36) (12.77) 
Round = 3 50.38*** 6.187*** 
  (12.39) (12.74) 
 
  
Constant 26.07*** 3.168*** 




Observations 3,987 3,987 
R-squared 0.239 0.232 
Number of households 1,504 1,504 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 12: Sensitivity analysis: short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in 
areas that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt credit dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 2000 2.255*** 0.305*** 
  (3.744) (4.227) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on labor supply) 0.220 0.0296 
  (0.720) (0.811) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural -0.796* -0.0987* 
  (-1.807) (-1.870) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 4.034*** 0.472*** 
  (13.42) (13.11) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*Dummy: at least one ngo member in household -0.238 -0.0518 
  (-0.543) (-0.987) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.416 0.0831 
  (0.712) (1.187) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in household 0.487* 0.0516 
  (1.751) (1.551) 
Household size 0.0153 -0.00382 
  (0.169) (-0.354) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.332* 0.0486** 
  (1.854) (2.265) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs 0.282* 0.0407** 
  (1.660) (1.998) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.171 0.0162 
  (1.182) (0.939) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs -0.123 -0.0240 
  (-0.509) (-0.828) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over -0.178 -0.0306 
  (-0.541) (-0.774) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00384*** 0.000487*** 
  (2.618) (2.771) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round -0.339** -0.0555*** 
  (-2.128) (-2.907) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.0492 -0.00312 
  (-1.501) (-0.795) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted with 
round -0.0232 0.00633 
  (-0.191) (0.435) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with round 0.943 0.150* 
  (1.278) (1.693) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in district  interacted 
with round 0.0561 0.0170 
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  (0.374) (0.948) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 0.0171 0.00789 
  (0.0666) (0.256) 
No of school in village interacted with round -0.134** -0.0209*** 
  (-2.073) (-2.703) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -1.184*** -0.175*** 
  (-3.528) (-4.357) 
Round = 2 15.48*** 1.795*** 
  (3.476) (3.364) 
Constant 15.94*** 1.778*** 




Observations 2,613 2,613 
R-squared 0.231 0.235 
Number of households 1,421 1,421 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




























Table 13: Sensitivity analysis: short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in 
areas that received road improvement between 2000 and 2005) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005 1.649* 0.227** 
  (1.842) (2.142) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on labor 
supply) -0.569 -0.0534 
  (-1.579) (-1.253) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural 0.785 0.0727 
  (1.532) (1.201) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 2.952*** 0.349*** 
  (7.798) (7.793) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005*Dummy: at least one ngo member in 
household 0.612 0.0725 
  (1.213) (1.215) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.557 0.0695 
  (0.954) (1.006) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.136 0.0253 
  (0.366) (0.578) 
Household size 0.0963 0.00923 
  (1.086) (0.881) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.0891 0.0158 
  (0.496) (0.743) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.177 -0.0220 
  (-0.913) (-0.963) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0407 -0.000951 
  (0.241) (-0.0477) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.244 0.0127 
  (0.881) (0.389) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.192 0.0219 
  (0.534) (0.515) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round -0.00460 -0.000799 
  (-0.456) (-0.687) 






Pre-project rainfall interacted with round 0.0765 -0.0185 
  (0.348) (-0.992) 
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No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 





No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round -2.190 -0.0814 
  (-1.244) (-0.700) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 1.088 0.107** 
 
(1.070) (1.992) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round 0.241 0.0300 
  (0.444) (0.467) 
Round = 3 -18.99 -0.978 
  (-0.458) (-0.561) 
Constant -35.86 -1.625 




Observations 1,316 1,316 
R-squared 0.226 0.220 
Number of households 717 717 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 














Table 14: Sensitivity analysis: long-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in 
areas that received road improvement between 1997 and 2000) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000 2.177* 0.311** 
  (1.789) (2.173) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on labor 
supply) -0.141 -0.0172 
  (-0.382) (-0.396) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural 0.182 0.0355 
  (0.375) (0.619) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 3.842*** 0.425*** 
  (10.60) (9.951) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*Dummy: at least one ngo member in 
household -0.753 -0.0955* 
  (-1.602) (-1.725) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 1.435** 0.185*** 
  (2.503) (2.743) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.309 0.0339 
  (1.030) (0.958) 
Household size 0.0996 0.00671 
  (1.312) (0.750) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.128 0.0229 
  (0.878) (1.332) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.0345 0.00127 
  (-0.255) (0.0798) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0685 0.00764 
  (0.513) (0.486) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.215 0.0227 
  (1.007) (0.905) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.218 0.0318 
  (0.750) (0.928) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00731*** 0.000803*** 
  (2.805) (2.616) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round 0.656** 0.0634** 
  (2.529) (2.076) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.301** -0.0302** 
  (-2.443) (-2.081) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round -1.170*** -0.120** 
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  (-2.825) (-2.468) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round -1.080** -0.0888 
  (-2.039) (-1.423) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round -0.257* -0.0156 
  (-1.843) (-0.948) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 1.507*** 0.190*** 
  (6.678) (7.153) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -2.005*** -0.251*** 
  (-6.982) (-7.427) 
Round = 3 59.40** 5.765* 
  (2.250) (1.854) 
Constant 27.13** 2.589 




Observations 1,738 1,738 
R-squared 0.290 0.295 
Number of households 975 975 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






























          
Dummy: treatment 0.194*** 0.181*** 0.523*** 0.290*** 
  (8.474) (5.567) (9.846) (3.295) 
Dummy: treatment*dummy=1 if hh 
is agricultural (based on labor supply) -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.136*** -0.132*** 
 
(-7.120) (-4.635) (-4.136) (-5.043) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted 
with round 0.000539*** 0.000858*** -0.00579*** -7.33e-05 
 
(10.44) (11.42) (-7.172) (-0.507) 








Pre-project rainfall interacted with 
round -0.0130*** -0.0198*** -0.284*** 0.00537*** 
 
(-11.82) (-10.31) (-7.604) (8.926) 
No. of commercial banks in the 
district interacted with round -0.0484*** -0.0581*** -0.633*** 
 




No of agricultural banks in 
district  interacted with round 0.154*** 0.377*** 1.682*** -0.000285 
  (6.713) (17.00) (6.917) (-0.00367) 
No. of Micro-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 0.0277*** 0.0611*** 
 
0.0526*** 
  (5.540) (9.026) 
 
(4.661) 
No of hospital in district interacted 
with round 0.0531*** 0.0657*** 
 
0.0366** 
  (6.959) (6.552) 
 
(2.147) 
No of school in village interacted 
with round -0.00404** -0.00340 
 
0.0192** 
  (-2.164) (-1.591) 
 
(2.262) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round 0.0728*** 0.0976*** 0.0540*** 0.0207 
 
(8.306) (7.379) (4.576) (1.587) 
 
    
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
Constant 9.873*** 11.11*** 16.37*** 5.572*** 
 
(49.45) (31.04) (11.31) (14.62) 
 
    
Observations 4,516 3,069 1,463 1,948 
Number of households 1,542 1,541 746 1,018 






Chapter 3: Does Access to Finance Matter in Microenterprise 
Growth? Evidence from Bangladesh 
 
Shahidur R. Khandker, Hussain A. Samad and Rubaba Ali 
                                              
3.1  Introduction 
 
Recent studies have pointed to the importance of the rural nonfarm sector (RNF) in 
developing economies. Rural nonfarm growth helps expand employment and income, 
provides forward and backward linkages with both the farm and modern sectors, and 
thereby leads to broad-based poverty reduction. Growth in the farm sector, with improved 
seed and other agricultural innovations, has been a major source of rural poverty reduction 
(Becerril and Abdulai, 2010, Mwabul, Mwangi and Nyangito, 2006).  However, this is not 
enough to absorb the burgeoning rural labor force in many countries where the modern 
sector is growing slowly. Therefore, development economics is paying increased attention 
to expansion of the rural nonfarm sector in order to generate additional productive 
employment which can absorb the surplus labor (e.g., Timmer, 2002; Chawanote and 
Barrett, 2012).  Moreover, given the increased pressure on land due to increasing 
population density, labor-intensive nonfarm activities can provide avenues for poverty 
reduction, without further stressing the land.  
  In a setting such as Bangladesh where the farm sector traditionally dominates, the 
RNF sector seems to be playing an important role in the growth of its rural economy (World 
Bank, 2007, Mahmud, 1996; Sen, 1996; Bhattacharya, 1996).7 There were some 4 million 
rural microenterprises in Bangladesh in 2003 (a number that has certainly increased over 
time) accounting for 30 percent of overall manufacturing value-added and 70 percent of 
the nonagricultural labor force (World Bank, 2007). Given the scope of this sector both in 
                                                           
7 The more organized part of the RNF sector consists of micro, small, and medium enterprises (simply termed 
microenterprises).Primary activities of the microenterprises in the RNF sector include manufacturing and 
processing industries, transport, trade, services and other miscellaneous activities. Throughout this paper, the 
term ‘enterprise’ and ‘microenterpise’ are used interchangeably.  
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terms of employment and income, growth in the nonfarm sector, especially in 
microenterprises, can play a significant role in furthering Bangladesh’s overall growth and 
poverty reduction (e.g., Khandker et al., 2013; Deininger and Jin, 2007).    However, 
growth in microenterprises seems to suffer from a variety of factors, of which lack of access 
to finance, infrastructure and markets, and poor quality of technology and regulatory 
barriers appear to be most common (World Bank, 2004; World Bank, 2007).   
  This paper addresses the role of finance as a barrier to microenterprise growth in 
Bangladesh.  Microenterprise investment is financed largely by informal sources such as 
individual savings and informal loans from friends and relatives.  Institutional credit can 
play a role, but it has until recently been marginal, as found in the analysis.  With the advent 
of microfinance institutions, microcredit is expected to play a bigger role in supporting 
microenterprise development in rural areas. However, scaling-up microcredit to support 
progressive microenterprises with diversified loan and competitive products has not been 
forthcoming as expected.  Thus, access to finance may still be a major hurdle for 
microenterprise growth.   
  A large body of literature has documented that access to better finance (in terms of 
better terms and conditions of loans as well as reliable sources) is an essential predictor of 
improved productivity and growth in any economy (e.g., Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; 
Johnson et al., 2002, Levine et al., 2000, Mukherjee and Zhang, 2007; McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005; Swada and Zhang, 2012; Wang 2008).  While other 
obstacles are also important, lack of access to finance consistently emerges as one of the 
most important and robust underlying factors constraining firm growth (Aterido et al., 
2011; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Honohan, 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2005; Buyinza and Bbaale, 2013; Deininger and Jin, 2007; de Mel et al., 2008; Rand 
2007).8  
  This paper attempts to document how access to finance affects microenterprise 
profitability and growth in Bangladesh.  It also examines the role of finance in the 
participation of microenterprise.  It addresses a set of pertinent questions for raising 
                                                           
8 Rand (2007) finds that faster growing firms tend to be more credit constrained, and Beck et al.(2005) 
observe that smaller firms are more credit constrained than larger firms. However, Aterido et al. (2011) 
show that the endogeneity of credit constraint is an issue in assessing the role of credit constraint, and once 
this issue is resolved, access to finance matters for all types of firms.   
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microenterprise growth and productivity: What underlying factors affect microenterprise 
growth? What constraints do the enterprises face other than credit? Do the constraints affect 
the performances of these enterprises? Do returns on micro-investment justify the cost of 
borrowing? This paper analyzes the nationally-representative Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (HIES) from Bangladesh over a period of 10 years (2000-2010) to 
examine the role of finance in enhancing microenterprise growth and productivity.  
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a discussion of the data used 
in the paper. Section 3 discusses the distribution of microenterprises and their salient 
features. Section 4 discusses how average returns to investment in the microenterprise 
sector was estimated using alternative productivity measures.  Section 5 identifies the 
extent of credit and non-credit constraints faced by micro-entrepreneurs. Section 6 presents 
model specification and its estimation strategy for estimating the impact of credit or non-
credit constraint on microenterprise productivity, and section 7 discusses the results. 
Section 8 estimates whether access to finance matters in microenterprise growth. Section 
9 analyzes the extent of cost-effectiveness of microenterprise investment supported under 
financial institutions, especially microcredit agencies.  Section 10 concludes.  
              
3.2  Survey and data   
 
Data for this study come from three rounds of Household Income Expenditure Surveys 
(HIES), carried out by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in 2000, 2005 and 2010. The 
surveys were geographically representative of whole Bangladesh. There were 7,440, 
10,080, and 12,240 households in 2000, 2005, and 2010, respectively. In all three surveys, 
urban households were overdrawn, and population weight was created to ensure national 
representativeness in the analysis.          
  The number of thanas, the lowest administrative unit (after division and district), 
covered was 295 in 2000, 366 in 2005, and 386 in 2010. Since the individual households 
cannot be tracked across the surveys, panel analysis of the survey data across years is 
possible at thana level only, that is what has been done in this study. Also the analysis is 
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restricted to rural households only. The final and cleaned data set contains 5,030, 6,031, 
and 7,840 households from 2000, 2005 and 2010, respectively.     
The surveys were conducted over the period of one year to capture the seasonal 
variation in income and consumption. The surveys collected information on household 
income, expenditure, savings, housing condition, education, employment, health and 
sanitation, etc. Besides the household questionnaire, a community questionnaire was also 
fielded during each of the surveys. Nonfarm self-employment activities of the households 
were covered in detail, including relevant information of nonfarm enterprises owned by the 
households (such as the particulars of enterprise asset, operation, cost and revenue). 
Altogether HIES data set provides a rich database for our analysis of the rural 
microenterprises in Bangladesh. For more information on the HIES, please visit BBS web 
site (http://www.gov.bd).     
 
3.3 Distribution of microenterprises and their salient characteristics 
In order to understand the role of this sector and the constraints it faces, we first need to 
examine the characteristics of the microenterprise sector.  Table 1 shows the distribution 
of microenterprise activities in rural Bangladesh.  There are 1,427 enterprises observed in 
2000 among 5,030 households in 2000, 1,426 enterprises among 6,031 households 
surveyed in 2005, and 1,909 units among 7,840 rural households covered in 2010.9  The 
service sector is the most dominant activity in all three years, accounting for 65.3 percent 
of all microenterprises in 2000, 75.8 percent in 2005 and 61.5 percent in 2010.  
Manufacturing and processing is at a distant second among microenterprise activities, 
accounting for only 13.9 percent in 2010, followed by the transport sector (13.1 percent).   
 Table 2 presents the salient characteristics of the microenterprises. Some of the 
characteristics do not change much over time, while others do substantially.  For example, 
although the average years of operation did not change much (8.8 years during the three 
periods), the share of registered enterprises increased from 9.9 percent in 2000 to 18.2 
percent in 2010. A small share of microenterprises are home-based (16.7 percent in 2010, 
                                                           
9 The number of microenterprises is higher than the number of households that own them due to ownership 
of multiple enterprises by the same households. In fact, some households operate as many as five 
microenterprises.    
101 
 
for example), but they do use mostly family labor (hired workers comprise less than 9 
percent of the workforce in 2010).  The number of workers did not vary much from 2000 
to 2010, averaging only 1.6.10 The microenterprises operate 10.6 months on an average, 
indicating that many do work year round.   
  Table 3 shows the distribution of sources of start-up capital.11  Own resources 
(savings or inheritance) account for the start-up capital for more than three-quarters of the 
microenterprises (close to 80 percent).12  Other major sources include microcredit; 
however, the share of the enterprises using microcredit as start-up capital was only 3.4 
percent in 2000 and 8.2 percent in 2010.  The other major source is informal loans from 
relatives and friends (about 6 percent of the microenterprises use that source).  Neither 
commercial banks nor informal lenders constitute an important source of start-up capital 
for microenterprises in Bangladesh.  Table 4 shows what percentage of enterprises report 
being constrained in operation of enterprises for these constrained enterprises what are the 
types of constraints that these enterprises face. 
3.4  Rates of return to investment in microenterprises  
To understand the various constraints faced by the microenterprises in rural Bangladesh, 
we must analyze the profitability or rates of return to investment in microenterprise, as it 
is the return from these activities that determines the growth potential of this sector. In this 
section, we examine various cost elements of and returns to enterprise operations. The cost 
of running enterprises has two elements: operating cost and family labor cost. Operating 
cost is the cost that the enterprises actually incurred, and includes paid expenses to conduct 
enterprise activities, such as the cost of rent, raw materials, fuels (e.g., kerosene, electricity 
etc.), finished goods purchased for reselling, hired labor, transport, interest payment, taxes 
                                                           
10 A great majority of the enterprises (over 75 percent) are basically one-person operations.  
11Financial institutions in rural Bangladesh also fund operating costs of the enterprises, not just their start-up 
cost. Unfortunately, HIES collected information on the sources of start-up capital only.     
12 Our findings are not inconsistent with findings from other countries:  For example, Raj and Natarajan 
(2007) find that, the share of borrowed to total capital in small and medium enterprises in Kerala, India was 
only 20 percent implying that 80 percent of the capital is personal savings.  de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2008) find in Sri Lanka that about 69 percent of start-up funds come from personal savings of micro-
enterprises owners. Paulson and Townsend (2004) find that in Thailand approximately 60 percent of the total 
initial investment in household businesses comes from savings. Hernández-Trillo, Pagán, and Paxton (2005) 
find that micro-entrepreneurs in Mexico mostly use their own resources/savings (60.8%). In Africa, personal 




and so on. Although rural microenterprises do not incur any cost for the labor provided by 
family members, the calculation of operating cost should include family labor, as there is 
an opportunity cost for it. The cost for family labor is calculated by multiplying total man 
days of labor provided by family members with the prevailing daily nonfarm wage in the 
village. The cost of family labor is very low, constituting not more than 5 percent of the 
operating cost. Profit is the revenue generated over the last 12 months less the operating 
cost. We create two measures of profit – one that uses operating cost without the imputed 
cost of family labor and another that takes the family labor cost into account as well.13  
Opinions vary on how to measure rates of return from microenterprises, because 
many rural microenterprises are informal and the actual cost of their inputs and outputs is 
often difficult to assess. The most common measure is the rate of return on assets (ROA), 
which is the enterprise profit as a percentage of enterprise assets and measures how well 
the enterprise utilizes assets to generate profits. This widely used productivity measure 
helps creditors and investors make lending or investment decisions, as it is assessed as 
proxy for repayment ability and compared with the opportunity cost of the capital.  
 Following the work of de Mel et al. (2008) and Samphantharak and Townsend 
(2011), we measure capital assets by combining the working capital and the imputed value 
of the enterprise.  We then divide the profit by capital assets to get ROA. We also define a 
second measure of productivity, the profit margin which is the profit as a percentage of the 
revenue. The profit margin is an indicator of an enterprise’s pricing strategies and how well 
it controls costs; that is, how cost-effectiveness its performance is across sectors. A higher 
profit margin indicates a high margin of safety.  
Table 5 shows the profit, profit margin and the average rate of return on enterprises 
and we estimate the average rate of return to be about 54.9%. Our estimates of average 
rates of return to assets are consistent with findings from other countries. For example, 
Kremer et al. (2010) estimate a lower bound on rates of return for the median shops to be 
greater than 100 percent per year. McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) similarly find large 
returns to small entrepreneurs. Exploiting county-level variation in credit supply due to the 
Community Reinvestment Act, Zinman (2002) estimates gross rates of return to capital in 
the US to be in the order of 20-58 percent per year. In another study, Urdy and Anagol 
                                                           
13 This second measure of profit will be used for subsequent analysis as it represents the true cost to enterprise. 
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(2006) take an elegant approach of using data on prices of used car parts of varying 
expected lifetimes to estimate a lower bound to the opportunity cost of capital of 60 percent 
for taxi drivers in Ghana. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) compute the rate of return to capital 
in the economy to be about 22 percent in India, and Caselli and Freyer (2007) calculate the 
marginal return of capital to be at most 19 percent for Sri Lanka.  
 
3.5  Constraints to microenterprise expansion and productivity  
Now that we have seen that there are substantial returns from microenterprise investments, 
we need to analyze what factors limit this sector’s growth.  More specifically, we would like 
to see if microenterprise growth in rural Bangladesh is constrained by lack of access to 
finance and other problems. Constraints limit the ability of the enterprises to operate at their 
optimal level, thereby lowering their productivity and ability to repay loans meant for 
carrying out enterprise operations. As Table 4 shows, the extent of self-reported constraints 
for rural enterprises is pervasive: in 2000, as many as 67 percent of the enterprises were 
constrained, although this figure declined to 50.2 percent in 2010.14 Among the various types 
of constraints during 2000-2010, credit or inadequate capital appears most frequently (about 
25 percent of the sample), followed by lack of raw materials (10 percent), inadequate demand 
for products and services (7 percent), miscellaneous problems (6.8 percent), and issues 
related to transport (5 percent).   
     
Table 5 shows the distribution of profitability for constrained and non-constrained 
enterprises.15 In theory, if returns to capital are diminishing, constrained entrepreneurs are 
likely to have higher returns to capital than the less constrained ones. This is because the 
constrained firms cannot increase capital as much as they would like, and therefore, are 
stuck at lower levels of capital. This is what we observe too.  For all activities, the rate of 
return for constrained entrepreneurs is 59.1 percent against 54.9 percent for non-
                                                           
14 While the enterprises owners faced multitude of problems running their businesses, they were asked to 
report just one - the single most severe constraint they faced.      
15 de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) find in the case of Sri Lanka high rates of returns (70-79 percent) 
for enterprises that are credit constrained and much lower returns for firms without credit constraints. They 




constrained entrepreneurs, with their difference being statistically significant.  This finding 
is similar to those found elsewhere (e.g., de Mel et al., 2008, for Sri Lanka).  Among the 
constrained enterprises, rates of returns are the highest in the transport sector (72.0 percent) 
followed by trade (59.4 percent), service (58.4 percent), manufacturing (57.5 percent), and 
miscellaneous activities (56.1 percent). The rates of returns also vary across type of 
constraints.  Within the constrained enterprises, returns are slightly higher for credit-
constrained enterprises (60.3 percent) than for non-credit constrained enterprises (58.3 
percent), although their difference is not statistically significant. 
  
 3.6. Estimating the impact of credit/non-credit constraint microenterprise 
productivity: model specification and estimation strategy 
In this section, we would like to examine the net impacts of credit and non-credit 




















ikjt NCVXTY ενηµρδγβα ++++++++=   
 (1) 
where ikjtY is the profitability (denoted by profit or profit margin) of i-th enterprise in k-th 
sector operating in j-th thana during year t, ikjtX is the enterprise-specific exogenous 
characteristics, jtV  the community-specific exogenous characteristics, ikjtC is whether the 
enterprise faced credit constraint, ikjtN is whether the enterprise faced non-credit constraint, 
y
ikjµ is the entrepreneur-specific unobserved heterogeneity, 
y
kjη  is the sector-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity,  
y
jν is thana-specific unobserved heterogeneity, 
y
ikjtε is a 
nonsystematic error, and T is the year. Our interest is to estimate the vector parameters, yδ
and 
yρ , measuring respectively the effects of credit or non-credit constraints on the 
performance of an enterprise.  If the measures of the constraints, ikjtC  and ikjtN , were 
exogenous, given exogenous enterprise and community characteristics, we could use a 
thana-specific fixed-effects (FE) model to estimate the parameters of interest. However, 
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the constraints may not be exogenously distributed across microenterprises; instead, they 
may be determined by the same unobserved factors that affect ikjtY . Let us explain it further 




























ikjt VXTN ενηµγβα ++++++=    (3) 
Because of the possibility of systematic relation between the errors in (1), (2) and 








ikjtε , the entrepreneurial-level 
unobserved heterogeneity (
y
ikjµ ) and sector-specific heterogeneity (
y
kjη ) cannot be 
cancelled out through a thana-level FE method which can only take care of thana-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity (
y
jν ).  
One way to account for the endogeneity in estimating equation (1) is to use 
instrumental variable (IV) technique in the FE model, and for that we must find instruments 
that enter into equations (2) and (3) only. That is, they will affect the constraints directly, 
and the profitability of the enterprises indirectly through the constraints. Aterido et al. 
(2011), used as instruments a set of business climate or environmental factors that affects 
enterprises of certain size in a specific sector in a location.  Following that, we construct a 
measure of each type of constraint (credit or non-credit) faced by enterprise by averaging 
the responses (whether the enterprises faced certain constraint) of all firms of certain size 
operating in a given sector (such as manufacturing) in a given thana (excluding the value 
of i-th enterprise from the computation of the average).16  The idea is to develop a broader 
measure of exogenous business environment in which an enterprise operates.  We then use 
these measures in equations (2) and (3) as additional regressors which can be treated as 
instruments.  However, not all entrepreneurs will respond to such business environment in 
the same manner.  Therefore, we interact entrepreneur characteristics such as age, 
education, and sex with the average thana-specific business environment factors and 
                                                           
16 To capture the size, enterprises are grouped into five equal size groups based on their revenue. 
Alternately, they can be grouped by the number of workers, however revenue-based groups give more 
variation and that is what we have used.     
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include them in equations (2) and (3) as additional instruments to identify the performance 
equation (1).  
 
3.7  Estimating the impacts of credit and non-credit constraints on 
enterprise productivity: results     
Before presenting the findings on the impacts of certain constraint on enterprise 
profitability, we discuss the determinants of the constraints themselves. A thana-level FE 
logit is applied to estimate equations (2) and (3) to find out what factors actually affect the 
probability of being credit and non-credit constrained for the enterprises, and the results 
are shown in Table 6 for a list of variables of particular interest. We find that higher is the 
level of owner’s education, lower is the probability of credit constraint faced by the 
entrepreneur. Non-land asset reduces the probability of being credit constrained, although 
it increases the probability of non-credit constraint.  The longer an enterprise is in 
operation, the higher is the probability of credit constraint and lower is the probability of 
non-credit constraint. Home-based enterprises and registered enterprises are less likely to 
be credit constrained.  Higher is the number of employees, the lower is the probability of 
credit constraint and higher is the probability of non-credit constraint. Manufacturing and 
service sector enterprises are more likely to be credit constrained, and transport sector is 
less credit constrained than miscellaneous activities.  The probability of being credit 
constrained is lower in a developed village, for example, those with higher access to 
electricity.  The opposite is true for villages with higher percentage of irrigated land.       
Table 7 presents the estimates of the impact of both types of constraints on the 
productivity of an enterprise. As mentioned, we use enterprise profit (log form) and profit 
margin as the outcomes. We report the findings of both fixed-effects (FE) model and fixed-
effects with instrumental variable (FE IV) models. Findings are similar in both models. We 
find that while the constraints (either credit or non-credit) have no significant effects on 
the level of profit, they have significant negative effects on profit margin.  Credit constraint 
lowers profit margin by 7.4 percentage points in fixed-effects model and 8.6 percentage 
models in FE IV model. This means that as their revenue grows, the profit of the credit-
constrained enterprises does not grow as much, which may be due to inefficient or 
suboptimal operations.  Among the entrepreneurial characteristics, male ownership 
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increases both profit level and profit margin, while age of the entrepreneur lowers profit 
without affecting profit margin. Duration of the enterprise has positive impacts on its profit 
– one additional year of enterprise duration increases its profit by about one percent. Profit 
is about 60 percent less in home-based enterprises than in independently-located ones. 
Somewhat surprisingly, registration of the enterprises does not affect their profitability.17 
The number of workers affects profit margin negatively, so does the share of hired labor. 
The sector of the enterprise matters to both profit and profit margin. Enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector have a higher profit (by more than 40 percent) than those in 
miscellaneous sector. Enterprises in the transport sectors are highly profitable and have a 
higher profit margin too. While the service-sector enterprises have a higher profit, they 
have a lower profit margin than those in miscellaneous small sectors.                  
Table 7 also reports various test statistics on the appropriateness of the IV model. 
The excluded instruments are jointly significant in determining the constraints. While we 
reject the exogeneity of the constraint variables in the equation for profit margin, we cannot 
do so in the equation for profit. The instruments pass the validity of the over-identification 
test as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions at 5 percent 
level. They also pass the tests for under-identification as we reject the null hypothesis of 
under-identifying instruments in both equations. Finally, they pass the test for weak 
instruments as shown by the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics and Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values for 5 percent relative bias. 
        
3.8. Do credit and non-credit constraints affect microenterprise 
expansion? 
Given that two-thirds of entrepreneurs operate under credit and non-credit constraints and 
that the constraints affect profitability and productivity, it is important to know whether 
financial and non-financial constraints affect microenterprise expansion.  Moreover, as 
credit is a major constraint for the microenterprises, affecting about 40 percent of the 
                                                           
17 This finding does not coincide with that of McKenzie and Sakho (2010), and Rand and Torm (2012), who 
find that registration increases firm profitability. However, McKenzie and Sakho (2010) also find that the 
impacts of registration are heterogeneous, benefitting only the medium-sized firms, while others incurring 
decrease in profits as a result of the registration. Since the enterprises studied in this paper are mostly small, 
they are perhaps not able to benefit from the registration process.     
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constrained entrepreneurs, we would like to know whether better access to finance (through 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), for example) can help promote microenterprise 
expansion.  The purpose here is to distinguish the roles of the underlying factors 
determining microenterprise expansion, including the roles of credit constraint.   













ijt VXTM εηµγβα +++++=    (4) 
where ijtX is a vector of household and entrepreneurial characteristics of household i in 
village j; jtV is a vector of village-level characteristics including electrification, share of 
irrigated land, program placement of microcredit and other credit programs, and shares of 
enterprises facing credit and non-credit constraints, T represents the year. mα ,  
mβ and  
mγ are unknown parameters to be estimated; and  mijtε  is a zero-mean disturbance term 
representing the unmeasured determinants of Mijt that vary across households. Note that 
household adoption is also affected by unobserved household heterogeneity and thana 




jη , respectively.  
  Since thana is the lowest common geographical units across the survey years, we 
use a thana-level fixed-effects logit model to estimate the probability of enterprise adoption 
in equation (4).18  Alternatively, we also run a pooled probit model.  Results from both 
estimations are presented in Table 8, which also reports the descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables.  
  As the results of Table 8 suggest, household characteristics matter to enterprise 
adoption. Male-headed households are more likely to adopt enterprise activities than 
female-headed ones. Younger heads adopt enterprises more than the older ones according 
to pooled regression. Households with more land assets are less likely to have 
microenterprises, while those with higher nonland assets are likely to adopt enterprise 
activities, according to both models. For example, according to fixed-effects model, a 10 
percent increase in land assets reduces the probability of enterprise adoption by 0.4 percent. 
                                                           
18 Please note that, while most thanas are repeated across the survey years, there are some that appear only in 
one or two years, resulting in an unbalanced panel.     
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This is not surprising as landed households are more likely to be engaged in farm activities. 
Since family labor is preferable to (as well as cheaper than) hired labor, large households 
are more likely to be engaged in nonfarm activities than the small ones. An increase of one 
family member raises the probability of adopting microenterprise activities by almost 2 
percent.  
Some village-level attributes such as program placement of microcredit have a 
significant role on the adoption of microenterprises according to pooled regression model. 
More specifically, the presence of a microcredit program in a village increases the adoption 
rate by 3.7 percent.  On the other hand, as per the pooled probit, a 10 percentage point 
increase the proportion of land under irrigation in a village increases the participation rate 
by 0.52 percent.  The extent of credit and non-credit constraints faced by the existing 
enterprises in the village, which represents a business climate, affect negatively the 
adoption rate of microenterprises in a village according to pooled regression.  A 10 
percentage point increase in the level of credit constraint in the village reduces the 
probability of adoption of an enterprise by 0.32 percent, while a similar increase in the 
extent of non-credit constraint reduces the probability of microenterprise adoption by about 
0.2 percent.  That is credit constraint seems to matter more than non-credit constraint in 
microenterprise growth.    
    
3.9 Cost-effectiveness of borrowing from MFIs    
 Micro-entrepreneurs in rural Bangladesh generally lack access to loans from formal 
financial institutions, and instead rely on their own savings, and perhaps on informal loans 
from family members, friends or informal lenders. Informal moneylenders, however, 
charge exorbitant interest rates, in the range of 180 to 240 percent a year (as shown in Table 
9), which make it difficult for micro-enterprises to sustain borrowing from them. Semi-
formal institutions such as microfinance institutions (MFIs), which have large network in 
rural Bangladesh, have the potential to alleviate microenterprises’ credit constraints. There 
is concern among policymakers in Bangladesh and throughout the world, however, that 
interest rates charged by MFIs are high and impose a burden on poor households (e.g., 
Faruqee and Khalily 2011). 
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  As Table 9 shows, MFIs indeed charge interest rates that are higher than 
commercial banks, both in Bangladesh and in other comparable Asian countries. For 
example, MFIs in Bangladesh charge annual interest rates in the range of 20-35 percent 
which fall in between the rates charged by commercial banks and informal lenders.   
However, MFIs may still be a viable option given that the rural micro-enterprises in 
Bangladesh typically do not have access to commercial bank loans, due to lack of (or low) 
collateral, networking, and financial literacy. The issue is whether the returns to 
microenterprise activities justify borrowing sustainably from MFIs. The examination of 
this issue should take into account the real cost of borrowing from microcredit (the 
effective rate of interest of microcredit loans).  
 The effective interest rate for MFI loans can vary depending on a number of factors, 
such as the lender, how the interest rate is calculated, and the loan terms (repayment 
schedule).19 Table 10 shows the effective interest rate for 25 MFIs that borrow from the 
country’s premier wholesale microcredit agency (PKSF) to make the microloans available 
to their borrowers (microenterprise owners). The average effective interest rate charged to 
microenterprises is 26.65 percent if they repay on a monthly basis, while it is 31.59 percent 
if they pay on a weekly basis. To make the microenterprise activities viable, the rate of 
returns have to be higher than the effective interest rate.  
The average rate of return earned by Bangladeshi microenterprises, as we found in Table 
5, is about 50 percent in 2010).20 Therefore, although MFIs charge higher interest rates 
than commercial banks, expansion of lending by these institutions to microenterprises 
could serve to eradicate credit constraints faced by micro-entrepreneurs and promote 
sustainable growth of the rural nonfarm sector.  
 
3.10  Conclusions 
Using nationally-representative data from three large household surveys conducted during 
the period 2000-2010, this paper examines whether inadequate access to finance constrains 
microenterprise growth and profitability in rural Bangladesh.  While estimating the effects 
                                                           
19 Details of interest rate calculation can be found in Faruqee and Khalily (2011).   
20 We consider the 2010 figure of average returns just to be conservative, as they are lowest in 2010. 
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of credit and non-credit constraints on productivity, this paper also address the following 
issues: (a) Is microenterprise investment profitable? (b) Does lack of access to finance 
matter in microenterprise growth? (c) Is borrowing from financial institutions a cost-
effective way of supporting microenterprise investment? Our analysis shows that the rate 
of return to microenterprise investment on average is high at about 50 percent per year.  
This means that an entrepreneur with an incremental investment of Tk. 1,000 in an activity 
can obtain Tk. 500 in profit per year.  Therefore, rate of return is not a constraint for 
microenterprise expansion and its growth.   
  What are the constraints to microenterprise growth? We find that both credit and 
non-credit constraints affect productivity as well as microenterprise growth in Bangladesh. 
While non-credit issues collectively pose a greater burden than credit constraints on the 
microenterprise owners, credit constraint is the single most severe constraint reported by 
them.  
More than 70 percent of enterprises’ start-up capital comes from entrepreneurs’ 
own savings, and if we include borrowing from friends and relatives, it explains more than 
85 percent of startup capital of rural microenterprises in Bangladesh.  That is, the 
opportunity cost of start-up capital is high, in the sense that households must either save or 
have wealthy friends and relatives in order to set up an enterprise.  
  Informal lenders can also provide funds to operate microenterprise activities.  
However, exorbitant interest rates (as high as 180 percent) make this option infeasible for 
financing microenterprise investment.  On the other hand, formal financial institutions such 
as commercial banks charge 10 to 12 percent interest rates and could thus be the most cost-
effective sources for financing rural enterprises. But formal credit institutions rarely 
finance rural microenterprise activities because of the high transaction costs involved with 
small loans for micro-entrepreneurs, who often lack adequate collateral for the loan.  Our 
data show that barely one percent microenterprises borrow from commercial banks to fund 
startup capital.   
In contrast, the country’s large microfinance institutions (MFIs) can be a major 
source for microenterprise expansion and growth, for a variety of reasons: (a) MFIs have a 
large network of outreach; (b) they do not require physical collateral to lend; and (c) they 
charge an effective interest rate close to 32 percent, which is much less than what is charged 
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by the informal lenders, while somewhat higher than commercial interest rate.  We find 
that some 8 percent of microenterprises acquired loans from MFIs to start-up 
microenterprise activities in 2010.  
Our analysis suggests that improved access to affordable loans through 
microfinance can help microenterprise growth.  Moreover, as returns to microenterprise 
investment are high and meet the cost of borrowing from MFIs, there are clearly large 
potentials for higher microfinance coverage for supporting microenterprise growth in 
Bangladesh. This has also been advocated by the findings of a recent study on Sri Lankan 
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All 3 years 
(N=4,762) 
Manufacturing and processing 11.9 10.3 13.9 12.1 
Transport 9.3 6.3 13.1 9.8 
Trade 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 
Service  65.3 75.8 61.5 67.0 
Other miscellaneous activities  11.1 5.1 9.2 8.6 
Note: Manufacturing and processing includes manufacturing and processing in food and beverages, tobacco, textiles, 
wood and furniture, rubber/plastic, basic metal and nonmetal products. Transport includes operation and rental of 
various transport vehicles. Trade includes wholesale and retail trading of various farm and nonfarm products such as 
livestock, poultry, vegetables, fruits, rice, furniture, utensils, shoe, clothing, operating stores, shops and so on. Service 
includes skill-based or specialized activities such as that of carpenters, masons, blacksmiths, electricians, barbers, 
tailors, real estate agents, social workers, counseling, banking, doctors, restaurant and hotel business, and so on, and 
the miscellaneous sector includes other small activities. 




Table 2: Salient characteristics of rural enterprises 






All 3 years 
(N=4,762) 

























Share of hired labor in total 






Owner’s sex (1-Male, 0=Female) 0.964 0.948 0.955 0.956 
Owner’s age (years) 44.5 46.1 46.7 0.458 
Owner’s education (years) 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.4 
Note: Owner’s characteristics are that of the head of the household that owns the enterprise. Figures in parentheses 
are t-statistics of the differences with the value from previous year.      







Table 3: Distribution of the sources of start-up capital of the rural microenterprises 






All 3 years 
(N=4,762) 
Own resource (asset, inheritance, savings, 
etc.) 
78.3 78.7 79.9 79.0 
Loans from microcredit  3.3 5.8 8.2 5.8 
Loans from commercial banks 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.8 
Loans from informal moneylenders  2.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 
Loans from relatives/friends    5.5 4.0 5.6 5.1 
Others  9.7 10.2 4.2 7.9 





Table 4: Enterprise distribution by constraints   







All 3 years 
(N=4,752) 
No constraints 33.0 23.8 49.8 36.3 
Inadequate capital or credit 27.1 25.5 22.1 24.8 
Inadequate knowhow 3.8 3.9 2.2 3.3 
High operating cost 0.1 0.0 3.6 1.3 
Unreliable/inadequate power/water 
supply 1.2 1.4 3.7 2.1 
Problems with equipment/spare parts 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.9 
Government regulations 2.5 4.0 1.1 2.4 
Lack of raw materials 10.5 18.1 2.8 10.0 
Inadequate demand of products 8.3 6.2 7.1 7.3 
Transport problems 2.5 7.1 5.0 4.8 
Other miscellaneous problems  9.3 9.4 2.2 6.8 
  Note: Enterprises may face multiple constraints, but only one (the most severe one) was reported per enterprise. 


















All activities 40,418.8 31,663.4 25,610.4 35,556.3 
(t=1.71) (t=-2.34) 
Profit margin 
All activities 0.395 0.282 0.266 0.292 
(t=13.83) (t=-2.85) 
Rate of return 
All activities 0.549 0.591 0.603 0.583 
(t=-3.01) (t=1.10) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics of the difference between two groups.   







Table 6: Determinants of credit and non-credit constraints faced by the enterprises  
(FE logit) (N=4,762) 
Explanatory variables Credit constraints Non-credit 
constraints 











































































































R2 0.093 0.104 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Regressions additionally include community prices of consumer goods,   
daily wage, etc., and agroclimate characteristics (land elevation, average number of sunny months, and excess rain 
amount per month. 
              Source: HIES 2000, 2005 and 2010 
  
 
Table 7: Estimates of the impacts of credit and non-credit constraints on microenterprise 
productivity (N=4,762) 



































































Education of the owner (years) -0.016 -0.001 -0.014 -0.0005 
122 
 
(-1.53) (-0.70) (-1.39) (-0.53) 
 











Enterprise is formally registered 



















































































R2 0.291 0.238 0.292 0.242 
 


















Weak identification for instruments (CD statistics)  F=364.81 F=364.81 
Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical value for 5% bias  18.76 18.76 
               Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Regressions additionally include household land and non-land asset and  
               community prices of consumer goods, daily wage, etc., and agroclimate characteristics (land elevation, average number  
               of sunny months, and excess rain amount per month. 












































































































R2 0.109 0.133  
Mean of the dependent variable        0.248     0.248  
      †These are actual values, not log.  
  Note: Estimates control for thana-level unobserved effects. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics except for those in    
the last column where they are standard deviations. Regressions also include community prices of consumer goods, 
daily wage, etc., and agroclimate characteristics (land elevation, average number of sunny months, and excess rain 
amount per month. 









Table 9: Annual interest rates (%) in selected Asian countries by lender type (2003) 
Country  Commercial Banks MFIs Informal money lenders 
Bangladesh 10-13 20-35 180-240 
Cambodia 18 45 120-180 
Indonesia 18 28-63 120-720 
India 12-15 20-40 24-120 
Nepal  15-18 18-24 60-120 
Philippines 24-29 60-80 120+ 










Table 10: Effective annual interest rate (%) of the partner organizations (POs) of PKSF 
Loan type Highest rate Lowest rate Average rate 
Rural microcredit (regular) 35.75 28.11 32.05 
Microenterprise (weekly payment) 34.67 28.39 31.59 
Microenterprise (monthly payment) 30.39 25.30 26.65 
 Note: The effective rate calculation takes into account all fees and additional charges paid by the borrowers, and 
thus,it correctly reflects the cost of borrowing.  








Technical Appendix for Chapter 2:  
Derivation of rental wages and rent in the equilibrium for case 1: 
Market clearing condition for capital imply that 
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Market clearing condition for labor imply that
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
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Substituting in NrK  and trK  in the inequality above we get the following inequality:   
 
Substituting in trK and after some algebra we get: 
 
 
Dividing both sides of the inequality by NrK we get:  
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α α φ+ +





≥  if and only if the following condition holds 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R L R L R
wL R y R
R R L R R R L R R
α δ
α α δ δ
    ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂




( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R L R L R
wL R
R y R R L R R R L R R
α α δ
α α α α δ δ
 ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂





( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1




y R y Ry R y R L R L R
wL R y R
R y R L R R R L R R
α α δ
α α α α δ δ
   ∂∂ ∂ ∂




Plugging in (1 )twL φ+ in the equation above we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )( ) (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




y R y Ry R y R L R L R
wL R wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ
α δ
α α δ δ




Plugging in NwL in the inequality above we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




y R y Ry R y R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
α δ
α α δ δ






Plugging in (1 ) tw Lφ+ in the inequality above we get: 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )






w L y R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ
δ δ






( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




w L y R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
⇒ + −




( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




w L y R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂+ −




Plugging in NwL in the inequality above we get: 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )






w L y R wL Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ
δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂+ −




( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )






w L wL R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R L R R R
φ δ
δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
⇒ + +





( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 (1 ) ( )






y Ry R L R
wL w L wL R

















y Ry R L R
wL w








Divide through by ( )NwL  we get 






y Ry R L R













δ δ+ in the above inequality we get 




y Ry R L R




We can rewrite the above inequality as 
( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R L R L R




Multiplying the above inequality with R we get 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R R L R R L R R






( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R R L R R L R R




Plugging in ( ) (1 )t NL R L Lφ= + + in the inequality above we get: 
( (1 ) ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t N NA
A N N
L L y Ry R R L R R R
R y R R L R L y R





( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
t NA
A N N
L y Ry R R L R R R
R y R R L R L y R
φ
  ∂∂ ∂
⇒ + + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥  
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂
⇒ − + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥  
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
Note total agricultural output when households produce only traditional crops is given by 
1 2
t t tY L K
α α=  
Taking derivative of agricultural output tY with respect to roads R we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21 11 2t t tt t t tdY dL dKL K L K
dR dR dR






≥  traditional agricultural output increases with road improvement, and it decreases when 
they are both less than zero. Therefore, we can deduce using Lemma 1 and that  0t
dY
dR
≥  if and 
only if 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥ and 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R





< if and only if
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
<  
and 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N tA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R

























β β = += +  
2 2
1 2 1 2
( ),  and solving for  we get that  
( ) ( )





y R y R
K R K R
K r
β δ
β β δ δ+ = ++ +=   




















φ β β = += + +  
condition (1 ) ( )for labor, Nh L L RL φ+ + =  and then solving for w , we get that
1 1
1 2 1 2
.
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NAy R y R
L R L R
w
β δ
β β δ δ
+
+ +
=   
 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 






















( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
d d
dR dR dR
y Ry Rdw NA
L R L R
β δ
β β δ δ
  
  
   


















∂ ∂  




( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
NA
A N
y Ry R L R L R
L R y R L R y R
R R R R
L R L R
β δ
β β δ δ
∂∂ ∂ ∂  − −  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  
  
   
+
+ +  
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
N NA A
y R y Ry R y R L R L R
L R R L R R R L R R
β δ
β β δ δ
    ∂∂ ∂ ∂















( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
1h N NA A A
A
dL y R y Ry R y R y R L R L R
wL R y R




β β δ δ
     ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    = − − −       + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂       
+
















≥  if and only if the following condition holds 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R L R L R
wL R y R
R R L R R R L R R
β δ
β β δ δ
    ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂




( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R L R L R
wL R
R y R R L R R R L R R
β β δ
β β β β δ δ
 ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂




Collecting terms we get: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1




y R y Ry R y R L R L R
wL R y R
R y R L R R R L R R
β β δ
β β β β δ δ
   ∂∂ ∂ ∂









(1 )hwL φ+ we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )( ) (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




y R y Ry R y R L R L R
wL R wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ
β δ
β β δ δ






Substituting ( ) (1 )N hL L R L φ= − + in the inequality above we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




y R y Ry R y R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
β δ
β β δ δ




Substituting ( ) (1 )1
1 2





in the inequality above we get: 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )






w L y R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ
δ δ
 + ∂∂ ∂ ∂




( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




w L y R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
⇒ + −




( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1




w L y R y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
⇒ + −











in the inequality above we get: 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )






w L y R wL Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R R L R R
φ δ
δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂+ −




( ) (1 ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )






w L wL y Ry R L R L R
wL
R y R L R R L R R R
φ δ
δ δ
+ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
⇒ + +





( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 (1 )






y Ry R L R
wL w L wL










Substituting in (1 ) ( )h NL L L Rφ+ + = in the inequality above we get:







y Ry R L R
wL w










Divide through by ( )NwL  we get 






y Ry R L R













δ δ+ in the above inequality we get 




y Ry R L R




We can rewrite the above inequality as 
( )( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R L R L R




Multiplying the above inequality with R we get 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R R L R R L R R




( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R R L R R L R R




Substituting (1 ) ( )h NL L L Rφ+ + = in the inequality above we get: 
( (1 ) ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h N NA
A N N
L L y Ry R R L R R R
R y R R L R L y R




( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
h NA
A N N
L y Ry R R L R R R
R y R R L R L y R
φ
  ∂∂ ∂+ + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥  
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≥  
 






























y R rR R r y R
r r R R
β β
β β β β
∂ ∂ −  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⇒ = −   ∂ ∂  
 
+ +  
Taking derivative of r with respect to R: 
( )( )
2 2
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
d d
dR dR dR
y Ry Rdr NA
K R K R
β β
β β β β
  
  
   






( ) ( )






y R K R











( ) ( )






y R K R







































( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
NA
A N
y Ry R K R K R
K R y R K R y R
R R R R
dR K R K R
dr β δ
β β δ δ
∂∂ ∂ ∂  − −  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  
  
   
= +




















≥  if and only if 
( )





























≥ if and only if 
2 2
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) 0
( ) ( )
2 2





y Ry R K R K R
K R y R K R y R
y R R R R Rr y R
R K R K R
β δ
β β δ δ




After some algebraic manipulation on the inequality above we get: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R K R K R
rK R y R
K R R R K R R R K R R
β δ
β β δ δ











( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
h N NA A A
A
dK y R y Ry R y R y R K R K R
rK R y R




β β δ δ
     ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  = − − −     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂     
+





≥  if and only if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R K R K R
rK R y R
R R K R R R K R R
β δ
β β δ δ





That is, if and only if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R K R K R
rK R
y R R R K R R R K R R
β δ
β β δ δ
    ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂






( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
N NA A A
A
y R y Ry R y R y R K R K R
rK R
y R R R K R R R K R R
β β δ
β β β β δ δ
    ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   ⇒ − + ≥ −    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    + + +
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2




y R y Ry R y R K R K R
rK R y R
R y R K R R R K R R
β β δ
β β β β δ δ
      ∂∂ ∂ ∂
     ⇒ − + ≥ −      ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      + + +
 
Plugging in ( )2
1 2









Plugging in ( )2
1 2









Dividing the inequality above by NrK we get the following inequality:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2




rK y R y Ry R K R K R
rK
R y R K R R R K R R
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
   ∂∂ ∂ ∂
 + ≥ −   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   + +







y Ry R K R
rK r
R y R R R
δ
δ δ
 ∂∂ ∂   + ≥   ∂ ∂ ∂   +
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y Ry R R R R K R
R y R y R K R
   ∂∂ ∂≥ −   ∂ ∂ ∂   
 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
NA
A N N
y Ry R R R K R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
   ∂∂ ∂
⇒ ≥ −   ∂ ∂ ∂  
 
Plugging in ( ) h NK R K K= + we get: 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
     ∂∂ ∂≥ − +     ∂ ∂ ∂    
 
 
 Proof of Proposition 2: 
When the agricultural sector produces only HYV crops, the output of the agricultural 
sector is the same as the output of HYV crops and is given by 1 2 .( )h h hY B R L K
β β=  
Taking derivative of the output hY with respect to road quality R we get 
1 2 1 2 1 21 1
1 2
( )
( ) ( )h h hh h h h h h
dY dL dKdB R
L K L K L K
dR dR dR dR
B R B Rβ β β β β ββ β− −= + +  
Because we assume that 0
( )dB R
dR
> , if 
( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
     ∂∂ ∂≥ − +     ∂ ∂ ∂    
 and 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 













( )( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ky R R R R K R
R y R y R K K R R
     ∂∂ ∂< − +     ∂ ∂ ∂    
 and 
( )( ) ( )
1 (1 )
( ) ( )
N hA
A N N
y R Ly R R R L R R
R y R y R L R L R
φ
 ∂∂ ∂− + + ∂ ∂ ∂ 











 may be positive or negative depending on the size of the value of first term 





Derivation of diversification condition under imperfect markets: 
Conditions for diversification under imperfect markets 
1 2 1 21 1
1 1 ( )t t h hL K B R L K
α α β βα β− −=  
 
1 2 1 21 1
2 2 ( )t t h hL K B R L K














φ δ δβ α β
  














φ δ δ β ββ α
    
= + −      + + +−    
 
As 0tL > , then ( )
1
1 2








φ δ δβ α β
  









>  + − 
, then 1
1 2
( ) ( )1
( ) 0
ˆ





− − > + 
 and therefore, 
1
1 2
( ) ( )1
( )
ˆ




















φ δ δ β βα β
    
= − −      + + +−    
 
Simillarly, as 0tL > then 2 2









φ δ δ β ββ α
    










    +−   
>0, then 2 2
1 2 1 2





δ δ β β
 










δ δ β β
 
+ > + + 
 and 1
1 2
( ) ( )1
( )
ˆ






















1 2 1 2
ˆ( )1
( ) 0
ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )ˆ
NA AyR yr K R
w w r r
y δ βα
φ φ δ δ β ββ β α
    








then ( ) 2 2
1 2 1 2
ˆ1









δ δ β ββ β α
   
− + − >   + +−   
 
2 2
1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ1
( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
A N AR y y K R ry
δ βα α
δ δ β ββ β α β α
    




1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ 1
( ) ( )
ˆˆ
A N AR y y K R ry
δ ββ α
α δ δ β ββ
   − − + >     + +  
 
After some algebraic manipulation this simplifies to 2 2






δ δ β β
 







The two conditions are:  
2 2






δ δ β β
 
+ > + + 
  (Inequality B) and 
1
1 2
( ) ( )1
( )
ˆ





> − + 
(Inequality C) 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Given that 1 1
1 2 1 2









φ δ δ β ββ α
  




Taking derivative of tL with respect to R we get: 
1 1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )( ) ( )ˆ ˆ1 1
ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )ˆ ˆ
N At y R y RdL R d dL R




φ φ δ δ β ββ α β α
        −                
= − +













dL ≥ if and only if 
1 1
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )( )
0N A
y R y RdL R d




δ δ β β
     ≥   
   
− +
+ +  
 
It follows from the above inequality that 0t
dR




1 2 1 2
( ) 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
N AN A
dL R dw dw
wy R y R wy R y R
dR w dR dR
δ β
δ δ β β
    − − ≥    
    
− +




1 2 1 2
( ) 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
N AN A
dL R dw dw
wy R y R wy R y R
dR w dR dR
δ β
δ δ β β
    
⇒ − − − ≥    
    
+
+ +  
After some algebraic manipulation we get that 0t
dR




1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( )
( ) 1
0
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Taking derivative of hL with respect to R we get the following equation: 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
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By Lemma 3, if 
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Total agricultural output: 
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>  therefore, if 0, 0, 0,  and 0,t t h hdL dKdL dK
dR dR dR dR




holds for sure, otherwise 
AdQ
dR
may be positive of negative depending on the size of each 
of the terms in the equation above.  
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Therefore, by Lemma 3, if 
' '1 1
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( )
( ) 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N A
N A N A
y R y R
w dL R dw
dR w dR
y R y R y R y R
δ β
δ δ β β
δ β δ β
δ δ β β δ δ β β
  
 + 
+ +  + ≥      























  > 
      
−
+




If Lemma 3 does not hold then , , ,  andt t h h
dL dKdL dK
dR dR dR dR
may not all be positive at the 
same time. Therefore, 
AdQ
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may be positive or negative depending on the size of each of 
the terms in the equation showing 
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Therefore by setting tL , ,t h hK L K  greater than zero and ,NK  NL greater than 0 we get  
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Empirical Appendix for Chapter 2:  
Table A: Effect of road improvement on access to credit  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: Ever received treatment 1.414*** 0.185*** 
  (4.642) (5.106) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agricultural land 
ownership) -0.207 -0.0208 
  (-0.855) (-0.725) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*dummy=1 if hh is 
agricultural -0.107 -0.0123 
  (-0.354) (-0.342) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.688* 0.102** 
  (1.848) (2.307) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in household 0.352* 0.0439* 
  (1.828) (1.919) 
Household size 0.144*** 0.0119* 
  (2.717) (1.882) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.241** 0.0334*** 
  (2.315) (2.697) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.0702 -0.00503 
  (-0.689) (-0.416) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs -0.0143 -0.00369 
  (-0.151) (-0.330) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.0103 -0.00324 
  (0.0692) (-0.183) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over -0.0621 -0.0121 
  (-0.306) (-0.502) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00840*** 0.00106*** 
  (10.04) (10.73) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round -0.325*** -0.0486*** 
  (-4.390) (-5.526) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.138*** -0.0156*** 
  (-9.829) (-9.384) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted with 
round -0.444*** -0.0511*** 
  (-9.009) (-8.736) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with round 2.432*** 0.339*** 
  (6.243) (7.336) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in district  interacted with 
round 0.141* 0.0253*** 
  (1.944) (2.942) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 1.056*** 0.145*** 
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  (7.600) (8.814) 
No of school in village interacted with round -0.209*** -0.0302*** 
  (-5.924) (-7.208) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -0.425** -0.0661*** 
  (-2.357) (-3.092) 
Round = 2 26.30*** 3.233*** 
  (11.86) (12.28) 
Round = 3 53.00*** 6.486*** 
  (11.95) (12.32) 
Constant 27.63*** 3.348*** 
  (10.38) (10.60) 
    
Observations 3,987 3,987 
R-squared 0.093 0.097 
Number of households 1,504 1,504 
t-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
HH represents household. 





Table B: Short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 1997 and 2000) 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000 2.022*** 0.282*** 
  (3.025) (3.538) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) 0.594 0.0858* 
  (1.360) (1.649) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural -0.848* -0.119** 
  (-1.714) (-2.027) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.518 0.0899 
  (0.804) (1.172) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.616** 0.0658* 
  (2.054) (1.840) 
Household size 0.00984 -0.00460 
  (0.101) (-0.395) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.438** 0.0608*** 
  (2.264) (2.641) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs 0.230 0.0348 
  (1.256) (1.594) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.0762 0.00582 
  (0.490) (0.314) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs -0.141 -0.0257 
  (-0.542) (-0.826) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over -0.379 -0.0534 
  (-1.064) (-1.260) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00307* 0.000398** 
  (1.946) (2.114) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round -0.282 -0.0485** 
  (-1.640) (-2.372) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.0533 -0.00362 
  (-1.508) (-0.859) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round -0.0242 0.00586 
  (-0.184) (0.375) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round 0.563 0.105 
  (0.709) (1.105) 
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No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 0.0959 0.0214 
  (0.594) (1.115) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round -0.118 -0.00689 
  (-0.424) (-0.208) 
No of school in village interacted with round -0.0543 -0.0117 
  (-0.785) (-1.422) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -1.323*** -0.191*** 
  (-3.662) (-4.426) 
Round = 2 14.61*** 1.693*** 
 (3.044) (2.960) 
Constant 15.71*** 1.761*** 
 (3.039) (2.859) 
   
Observations 2,613 2,613 
R-squared 0.102 0.117 
Number of households 1,421 1,421 
t-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
HH represents household. 





Table C: Short-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 2000 and 2005) 






      
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005 1.255 0.182* 
  (1.410) (1.726) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) -0.229 -0.0358 
  (-0.478) (-0.630) 
Dummy: received treatment between 2000 and 
2005*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural 0.816 0.0827 
  (1.577) (1.352) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 0.227 0.0338 
  (0.358) (0.451) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.357 0.0512 
  (0.895) (1.086) 
Household size 0.161* 0.0170 
  (1.689) (1.506) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.0268 0.00825 
  (0.139) (0.362) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs -0.156 -0.0192 
  (-0.750) (-0.782) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs -0.0292 -0.00886 
  (-0.161) (-0.414) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.243 0.0123 
  (0.820) (0.352) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.408 0.0464 
  (1.059) (1.019) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round -0.0109 -0.00157 
  (-1.013) (-1.266) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round  0.260 
   (1.316) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round 0.212 -0.0305 
  (0.903) (-1.532) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round 1.421  
  (1.080)  
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round -3.476* -0.0506 
  (-1.853) (-0.402) 
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No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round 1.410 0.105* 
  (1.293) (1.817) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round 0.360 0.0433 
  (0.622) (0.631) 
round = 3 -42.92 -1.926 
  (-0.968) (-1.032) 
Constant -83.46 -3.483 
  (-0.948) (-0.950) 
    
Observations 1,316 1,316 
R-squared 0.100 0.093 
Number of households 717 717 
t-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
HH represents household. 





Table D: Long-run effect of road improvement on access to credit (in areas that received 
road improvement between 1997 and 2000) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES credit amt 
credit 
dummy 
      
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000 2.507* 0.346** 
  (1.935) (2.290) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) -0.235 -0.0148 
  (-0.468) (-0.254) 
Dummy: received treatment between 1997 and 
2000*dummy=1 if hh is agricultural -0.420 -0.0444 
  (-0.805) (-0.731) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 1.397** 0.178** 
  (2.215) (2.425) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 0.309 0.0324 
  (0.947) (0.850) 
Household size 0.164** 0.0135 
  (1.969) (1.389) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 0.132 0.0231 
  (0.826) (1.247) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs 0.0166 0.00657 
  (0.113) (0.385) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs -0.0391 -0.00411 
  (-0.267) (-0.241) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.0192 0.000403 
  (0.0836) (0.0151) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 0.0719 0.0171 
  (0.227) (0.462) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round 0.00590** 0.000647* 
  (2.064) (1.941) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round 0.427 0.0382 
  (1.513) (1.160) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.210 -0.0202 
  (-1.558) (-1.283) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round -0.863* -0.0866 
  (-1.906) (-1.640) 
No of agricultural banks in district  interacted 
with round -0.579 -0.0334 
  (-1.012) (-0.500) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round -0.0838 0.00307 
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  (-0.556) (0.175) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round 1.426*** 0.181*** 
  (5.832) (6.336) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -1.932*** -0.244*** 
  (-6.231) (-6.761) 
Round = 3 40.74 3.723 
  (1.406) (1.103) 
Constant 19.19 1.725 
  (1.286) (0.992) 
    
Observations 1,738 1,738 
R-squared 0.161 0.184 
Number of households 975 975 
t-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
HH represents household. 





Table E: Effect of road improvement on interest rate paid by those who borrowed money 





    
Dummy: Ever received treatment -1.681 
  (-0.345) 
Dummy=1 if hh is agricultural (based on agri-
cultural land ownership) -4.363 
  (-1.311) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*dummy=1 if hh is 
agricultural 9.408*** 
  (2.732) 
Dummy: at least one ngo member in household 0.681 
 (0.260) 
Dummy: Ever received treatment*Dummy: at least 
one ngo member in household 1.663 
 (0.463) 
Log of household head's age (yrs) 1.870 
  (0.409) 
Log of maximum no. of years of schooling in 
household 2.358 
  (1.144) 
Household size -1.473** 
 (-2.217) 
Number of hh members aged 0 to 6 yrs 1.856 
  (1.557) 
Number of hh members aged 7 to 13 yrs 0.0641 
  (0.0550) 
Number of hh members aged 14 to 35 yrs 0.311 
  (0.276) 
Number of hh members aged 35 to 59 yrs 0.508 
  (0.280) 
Number of hh members aged 60 and over 2.429 
 (1.061) 
Pre-project pop_density interacted with round -0.0247** 
  (-2.352) 
Pre-project literacy interacted with round 2.397*** 
  (2.619) 
Pre-project rainfall interacted with round -0.186 
  (-0.692) 
No. of commercial banks in the district interacted 
with round 0.0532 
  (0.0648) 
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No of agricultural banks in district  interacted with 
round -14.33*** 
  (-3.184) 
No. of Multi-finance institution in 
district  interacted with round -1.944** 
  (-2.266) 
No of hospital in district interacted with round -3.050** 
  (-2.071) 
No of school in village interacted with round 1.026*** 
  (2.767) 
Dummy: village has electricity*round -0.123 
 (-0.0590) 
round = 2 -17.80 
 (-0.493) 






Number of households 1,113 
R-squared 0.063 
t-statistics in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
HH represents household. 
  
 
 
 
 
